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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that the GIF, as an underexplored analytical vertex within the
broader matrix of media ecologies, should be understood as a generative nodal
point in the American system of racialized violence. Thought in relation to its
medium specificity, the GIF’s materiality, particularly its capacity for infinite
looping, is critically interrogated for its potential to amplify the circuitry of
dominating racialization that felicitously condition the GIF’s circulation. I open my
argument with focus on a subset of the GIF genre known as the reaction GIF,
which, in its frequently racialized form, is situated within the interconnected
genealogies of the figures of the mammy, the minstrel, and the machine. The
reaction GIF is shown as a contemporary iteration of minstrel performance,
known as blackface minstrelsy, that is deeply imbricated with the subordinating
racialization of Black women. I demonstrate that the violent genealogies of
mammy, minstrel, and machine facilitate the machinic transfiguration of Black
women made into GIF content, a process of making-machine of the Black
woman subject. Making-machine is the site of ontological capture the racialized
reaction GIF institutes, and those Black women caught within its digital field
become the inhuman iconography of the medium’s motif. To substantiate this
account of the racializing properties of the GIF, the text engages the GIF at the
level of its mediatic specificity and through questions of affective labor and its
expropriation. I contend that the mediatic properties of the GIF are central to its
modulating brokerage of affect, and it is this capacity to disperse infinitely
differentiated affective impulses that underpins the racialized reaction GIF’s
making-machine of Black women subjects.
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CHAPTER 1
BLACK OVERKILL AND ONTOLOGICAL CAPTURE IN THE DIGITAL FIELD: EXORDIA ON
THEORY AND METHOD
Ongoingly assembled and updated through a bricolage of local news
coverage, official state administrative and law enforcement websites, social
media reporting, and independently maintained information networks, the
Washington Post’s “Fatal Force” was conceived in 2015 to create “a database
cataloguing every fatal shooting nationwide by a police officer in the line of duty,
[including] data on those who were killed and the details of the shootings.”1 The
diversity of source material “Fatal Force” employs to document police lethality
reflects the project’s commitment to reflexively threading porosity into the
boundaries of its archive. An archive is intended to establish the limits of the
epistemological, that which is knowable, and it maintains those limits through
iterative repudiations and disavowals, separating the proper from the improper.
“Fatal Force” refuses to congeal the walls of its archival constitution by
maintaining a critical self-position. This impulse to resist the archive’s
conventional disciplinarity and to favor unforeseeable porosity undergirds the

1

“Police Shootings 2016 Database,” Fatal Force, Washington Post, accessed October 3, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2016/. The scope of “Fatal
Force” is informed by the circumstances surrounding the 2014 murder of Michael Brown in
Ferguson, Missouri, a decisive moment in the development of the protest movement now known
as Black Lives Matter and its concomitant emphasis on police accountability for unnecessary
violence across the United States. “Fatal Force” directs its archival impulse toward those
shootings in which an on-duty police officer shot and killed a civilian, circumstances that, per the
Post, “most closely parallel” those of the murder of Michael Brown. “Police Shootings 2018
Database,” Fatal Force, Washington Post, accessed October 3, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/ national/police-shootings-2018/. An examination
of this abstracting maneuver—and what this event parallelism may occlude or distort—cannot be
adequately addressed here.

1

epistemological status “Fatal Force” ascribes to its varied archival contents.
Officiated digital discourses of the state are not endowed with an a priori
objectivity that would secure those claims as beyond the field of the political and,
as a consequence, outside the field of critique. Social media reporting, for
example, is not disavowed as exemplifying the peculiar and subjective, a form of
knowledge thus rendered irreconcilable with the very notion of knowledge itself.
Its truth-value is recognized to be concomitant with those other discursive fields
with which it may be in tension.
Recognizing an immanent potential of change as constitutive of its
archive’s morphology enables “Fatal Force” to provide a more accurate account
of on-duty police officers’ application of lethal techniques than that proffered by
the data collected by various federal agencies pursuant to legal mandate.2 As the
Post notes and administrative officials readily acknowledge, data collected by
federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Center for
Disease Control and Prevention, and the Department of Justice, suffer manifold
lacunae and inconsistencies.3 Statutory restrictions on permissible data the
difficulty of sharing information across and among governmental agencies yield a
disconcertingly flawed picture. Moreover, whatever data have been successfully
compiled are not released for public review with any consistency—in full
contravention of express legal requirement that such data are published on an

2

See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 34 U.S.C.A § 12602(a)
(West 2018) (“The Attorney General shall, through appropriate means, acquire data about the
use of excessive force by law enforcement officers.”)
3
“Police Shootings 2018 Database.”

2

annual basis.4 Insofar as the data accumulated by “Fatal Force” is publicly
available for review and is the result of synthesizing a diverse array of source
materials, the project stands to offer a more accurate (though still incomplete)
account of the frequency with which police brutality occurs and the character of
those occurrences.
The felicitous structure of “Fatal Force” enables the articulation of
questions that might otherwise be foreclosed by sole reliance on incomplete,
government-generated reports. For example, what do the data compiled by
“Fatal Force” indicate about police brutality in the United States? Against Black
persons, more specifically?5 According to its statistics, last updated on October 1,

4

See 34 U.S.C.A. § 12602(c) (West 2018) (“The Attorney General shall publish an annual
summary of the data acquired under this section.”). In a 2016 report released by the
Congressional Research Service addressing federal efforts to collect data on public trust of law
enforcement, a review of the multiple federal programs intended to collect data on misuse of force
by law enforcement underscored both the infrequent satisfaction of this statutory mandate and
the inability of federal agencies to effective share and synthesize data. See Nathan James et al.,
Congressional Research Service, R43904, Public Trust and Law Enforcement: A Brief Discussion
for Policymakers (2016), 5–8, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43904.pdf.
5
A matter of political editorial intention must be noted here. Throughout the entirety of this text, I
have consciously rendered “Black” in the upper case. This decision follows first from my adoption
of an ethical orientation informed by the positions of Black scholars, writers, and activists. For
example, journalism scholar Lori L. Tharps holds that “when speaking of a culture, ethnicity or
group of people, the name [Black] should be capitalized. Black with a capital B refers to people of
the African diaspora. Lowercase black is simply a color.” Lori L. Tharps, “The Case for Black with
a Capital B,” New York Times, November 19, 2014. In agreement with Tharps is Black writer and
cultural critic Touré, who explains the rationale behind his decision to render Black in the upper
case as follows: “I have chosen to capitalize the word ‘Black’ and lowercase ‘white’ throughout
this book. I believe ‘Black’ constitutes a group, an ethnicity equivalent to African-American,
Negro, or, in terms of a sense of ethnic cohesion, Irish, Polish, or Chinese.” Touré, Who’s Afraid
of Post-Blackness? What It Means to Be Black Now (New York: Free Press, 2011), ix. I have
chosen the locutions “Black” and “non-Black” in order to center the consequences of the
racialized images at the heart of this analysis. In a concordant register, Catharine MacKinnon
remarks of her writing “white” in the lower case that, “under current conditions of white
supremacy, [‘white’] seems . . . to require no underlining as an affirmative self-identification.
Capitalizing both [Black and white] would also communicate an equality that is false, and would
take no side toward making the equality a true one.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism
Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987),
238n12.
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2018, there have been at least 90 instances of unarmed Black men and women
being shot and killed by on-duty police offers since January 1, 2015.6 Many of
these murders, including those of Eric Harris, Walter Scott, and Keith L. Scott,
were captured on video, either by cellphone, body camera, or dashboard
camera, and, in the wake of their tragic deaths, these videos were disseminated
widely across social media platforms.
As video recordings of instances of police brutality became increasingly
embedded in the circuitry of sociodigital media ecologies, they experienced a
broad diffusion, one whose velocity magnified breathlessly by exploiting the ease
of translation across social media platforms. While the omnipresent barrage of
these recordings certainly did much work to galvanize a coordinated public
response to the long history of police officers’ misuse of lethal force, I would not
limit the effects of these recordings to the necessary political critique they
inspired. Nor would I circumscribe their consequence to the resurrection of
memories of trauma, violence, and subjection within those Black men and
women inadvertently exposed to the videos’ contents through platforms like
Facebook or Twitter, which typically enable automatic playback of movementimage content as a default setting.7 These videos might also be understood, I

6

This figure was calculated by filtering the “Fatal Force” data available for download through two
metrics: “Armed” (for which “unarmed” was selected) and “Race” (for which “B,” standing for
Black, was selected). The data compiled by the project is available for public download under a
Creative Commons license and may be found on the Washington Post’s GitHub webpage,
available here: https://github.com/washingtonpost/data-police-shootings.
7
My use of “movement-image” throughout this discussion endeavors a twofold signification. First,
the movement-image is that which fundamentally contrasts with a static image. Under this
(admittedly reductive) schema, a photograph would be classified as a static image, while a
cinematic or television scene would be regarded as a movement-image. Second, the movementimage is that which Gilles Deleuze argues is “strictly the same” as “flowing matter,” such that the
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would contend, as participating in a gradual transformation of contemporary
temporal orders, one through which the violent system of American racialization
locates a condition of its felicity.
In an ostensibly divergent register, Jonathan Crary advances an
interpretation of the radical transformation of present-day temporality as
indissociably linked to the internecine injunctions of global neoliberal capital. He
describes the temporal fold of (post)modernity as “a time without time, a time
extracted from any material or identifiable demarcations, a time without sequence
or recurrence.”8 For Crary, time has become fully coextensive with the meaning
of impossibility, whereby one unwittingly acquiesces to “a simulated release from
the hindrances of being alive which are incompatible with circulation and
exchangeability.”9 The temporality of the present is an atemporality, a not-time
that admits of neither past nor present nor future, the irruption of the Real into the
conscious of everyday worldmaking and the crystallized guarantor of humanity’s
end.

meaning of “image” must be recognized as equivalent to the meaning of “movement.” Although
Deleuze never explicitly provides a succinct conceptual account of the movement-image, his
descriptions of those scenes and films he takes to be formalistically organized around the
movement-image genre share certain attributes: formal representations of space and time,
regulation by discrete sensory-motor functions, and the presumption of teleological, progressive,
linear time. Movement-images proceed from a temporal point of “origin” to a temporal point of
“conclusion.” They mirror modernist investments in Cartesian spatiotemporality. And, their
purpose is to reflect the kinetic movement of bodies in space-time, such that it becomes
exceedingly difficult to separate the movements of subject’s own body from the movements
depicted in the image; matter flows between these body-images and among them, without
perceptible discontinuity. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 58–59.
8
Jonathan Crary, 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep (New York: Verso, 2013), 29.
9
Ibid., 104–5.

5

Although I am sympathetic to Crary’s intended intervention, I would
nevertheless note the following: Crary’s description of the contemporaneous
present as without time, sequence, or recurrence is, I believe, in tension with his
description of the subject who lives within its temporal decree. Crary contends
that the subject living in an era of neoliberal global capital—that is, the living of a
certain Western subject, one who occupies a certain position within the West’s
myriad social worlds, a distinction not altogether clear in Crary’s formulation—
must (self-)dissolve into a binarized digital algorithm if she is to properly function
within capital’s networks of circulation and exchange. Such is the subject of the
world under neoliberal capital, a subject who, so posited, represents less
embodiment in its multiple specificities and more the site of inadvertent
catachresis. Indeed, contrary to the sweeping conceptual thesis Crary proffers,
the conditions of the unfolding present that conduct the dissolution of the
subjects subordinated to neoliberal imperatives, as well as the positions occupied
by those subjects who are differentially subordinated to such imperatives, must
be hailed as neither uniform nor universal. An analysis of the unfolding present
which proceeds from a conceptual axiomatic regarding the former as “a time
without time” founders, I would argue, at the moment of its utterance. This is
because there can be no univocal, singular “time” to which all subjects and
worlds are bound; there is no single act of disaggregation which irreparably and
monolithically dissolves “the subject” into capital’s flows. Rather, what must be
envisioned is an burgeoning multiplicity of temporal planes whose operations are
neither fully discordant nor fully concordant. Their work is uneven, accretive,
6

disbanding, upending, calcifying, and proliferating, a matrix whose radial
expansion signifies the multitude of presents a subject may inhabit as well as the
ultimate impossibility of clearly demarcating between past, present, and future.
This is not to deny, however, Crary’s illuminating insight into the mode of
compulsory dissolution the subject experiences upon injection into the flows of
global capital. Rather than emphasize the subject who is both singular and
universal, I would alternatively propose that what is exposed to dissolution are
the fractured subjectivities loosely constitutive of the subject as we conceive it—
those artificially conjoined, immanently fragile, and always incomplete elements
whose psychic-corporeal integration endeavors to make legible the signifying
work of the term “personhood.” The subject-qua-person may indeed be forced to
fracture what she perceives as her composite being at the dominating will of
capital, but it does not follow that the temporal character of this submission is that
of “a time without time.” Injection into the flow of capital may instead place her in
an infinitely recurring series of relations all differentially animated by capital’s
exploitative logic. Capital’s circuitry, its Nietzschean promise of an infinitely
recurring transformation and return of labor-value into product and profit and
back into alienating labor again, will not be, under such conditions, a time without
sequence or repetition. For the subject exposed to its impossible precarity, the
temporality of capital will be its temporalities, its many times and their
irreducibility to one another.
Said otherwise, we might otherwise envision the time of the
contemporaneous present simultaneously as the temporality captured by
7

capital’s expropriation of labor, asymptotically approaching a temporal flow
outside any phenomenological experience thereof, and, pivoted toward an
instance of particularity, as the temporalities codified by the repeated refrain of
police brutality and its endless display on social media platforms. To situate
these temporal orders as overlapping fields does not require disavowing the
imperiling tendencies of structural recurrence, here exemplified by capital and by
repeating videos of the murder of Black men and women. Their overlap, insofar
as they both function through differential processes of constitutive abstraction,
can be critically mined and analytically concretized by repeatedly centering their
connections to the material violence that accompanies quotidian worldmaking.
Contra Crary, then, the possibility that time may be caught in an abstracting loop,
that this loop may augur the horrors of infinite repetition without necessarily
embracing that structural infinitude may gesture toward an imperceptibly
extending, protean ecology of power relations whose roots have taken hold in
unusual and putatively contradictory ways.10
In the domain of new media, the automaticity of playback and the infinite
loop are considered characteristic of the digital-image file known as the Graphics
Interchange Format, or GIF, which, due to its surging social and cultural
popularity, is now considered “an essential part of the digital lexicon.”11 Broadly
10

For an interesting discussion of the relationship between the GIF and the 24/7 temporality
Crary deems fundamental to contemporary capitalist cultures, as well as one that both coheres
with and departs from my own thinking on Crary’s provocations, see David Bering-Porter, “The
Automaton in All of Us: GIFs, Cinemagraphs, and the Films of Martin Arnold,” Moving Image
Review & Art Journal 3, no. 2 (2014).
11
Richard Yao, “The Surging Popularity of GIFs in Digital Culture,” IPG Media Lab, Medium, April
5, 2018, https://medium.com/ipg-media-lab/the-enduring-popularity-of-gifs-in-digital-culture54763d7754aa.
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described, a GIF is a self-contained, animated image sequence that endlessly
repeats its delimited content. The GIF, now a frequent aspect of contemporary
digital talk, offers a mode of communication more rooted in the cultural and
dynamically visual than conventionally textual modes. What marks the GIF as
unique among varied digital-image formats is its capacity to store and transmit
repeating animated sequences without depending on the usual hardware
burdens associated with the transmission of video files. The content of an
animated GIF is known as a “looping sequence,” which, per Kate M. Miltner and
Tim Highfield, has the technical capacity to display “multiple frames on repeat
[stored] within the same image file without [requiring] the size (or resolution) of a
video [to play].”12 After it has been shared, either via a text-messaging application
or on a social media platform, the GIF will continue its circular cinematic as long
as it is within the visible interface boundaries of a user’s device (e.g., an iPhone,
a laptop, etc.).
The popularity of GIFs in digital communication has resulted in a variety of
patterns of usage, content creation, and cultural critique—as well as patterns of
violence, appropriation, and cultural denigration. An article written in August 2017
by freelance journalist and doctoral student Lauren Michele Jackson, entitled
“We Need to Talk about Digital Blackface in Reaction GIFs,” comments on one
such pattern, the disproportionate use of looping images of Black men and
women as GIF content, which enables the production and permissibility of what

12

Kate M. Miltner and Tim Highfield, “Never Gonna GIF You Up: Analyzing the Cultural
Significance of the Animated GIF,” Social Media + Society 3, no. 3 (2017): 3.

9

Jackson calls “digital blackface.”13 GIFs become the mode through which
caricatures of Black persons can proliferate in abundance, with the concordant
dehumanization such caricatures secure obscured by the allegedly innocuous
contexts of these GIFs’ circulation.
GIFs and the purposes of their circulation may, at first blush, appear
situated in a field of emergence vastly disparate from that of police brutality
footage disseminated on social media platforms. Arguing otherwise, I would
contend that these two modes of mediatic expression are not at all dissociable.
Rather, the ontological violence police brutality footage indexes might be
understood as conditioned by a process through which Black men and women
are evacuated of any claim to a shared status of “human” and transformed into a
machinic objecthood—a process subtended and reproduced by the circulation of
racialized reaction GIFs. The infinite looping of Black bodies caught in the
extractive cycling of the GIF mobilizes that repetition to heighten the racist
production of minstrelized and mammified scenes while that same automaticity
transforms the Black body into an uncanny figure, a machine that executes its
program in loop and therefore cannot claim the ontological status of human.
Among the critiques intimated by the galvanizing political imperative
“Hands Up, Don’t Shoot!” is a recognition of the state’s capacity for racializing
discipline and the biopolitical production of concurrently docile and dangerous
Black bodies. “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot!” signifies the comportment of a mortal

13

Lauren Michele Jackson, “We Need to Talk about Digital Blackface in Reaction GIFs,” Teen
Vogue, August 2, 2017, https://www.teenvogue.com/story/digital-blackface-reaction-gifs.

10

injunction to instantaneously detach from the coordinates of the Black bodily
frame. It unabashedly accents that submission to its injunction is a necessary,
though by no means sufficient, condition of survival for any Black person forcibly
thrust into the crosshairs of the state’s violent policing apparatus. What is the
consequence of this disciplinary regime when its mandates always already
undergird an encounter with police brutality? One might consider the footage of
Keith Lamont Scott’s murder, which was recorded by his wife, Rakeiya Scott,
who documented the scene with a stability of frame likely unintelligible to those
beyond the state’s racializing vice grip on Black lives.14 One might examine the
cellphone footage of the murder of North Charleston, South Carolina, resident
Walter Scott, taken by community member Feidin Santana.15 Santana tracks the
scene coolly and slowly—even after an officer emitted a barrage of gunfire into
Scott’s back. Santana’s grip remains steady, almost detached; one might even
describe as machine-like.
The making-machine of Black men and women—as well as of persons of
color more generally, Indigenous Americans, trans persons, and numerous
others whose bodily legibility incites a cascade of violent social disqualification—
is part and parcel of the ongoing process of racialization that constitutes Black
subjects as necessary sites of violence, encouraged and effected by state and

14

See “Charlotte Shooting Video: Footage Shows Fatal Encounter Between Police, Keith Lamont
Scott,” U.S. News, NBC News, last updated September 23, 2016,
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/charlotte-shooting-video-footage-shows-fatalencounter-between-police-keith-n653426.
15
See “Video Shows Fatal Police Shooting,” Times Video: Race in America, New York Times,
April 7, 2015, https://nyti.ms/1yTnTsi.
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individual alike. GIFs whose intelligibility depends on the modality of digital
blackface Jackson identifies situate Black bodies in an infinite loop of affective
extraction and dehumanizing labor; the repetition of the movement-image that is
a GIF’s content forces the Black body to veer toward the position of the uncanny,
of the not-human. This position of not-human is as much the enabling condition
of police brutality against unarmed Black men and women as it is the disciplinary
injunction to which Black individuals most submit their bodies if they are to
survive the exacting violence of a racializing state.
This thesis will argue that the GIF, as an underexplored analytical vertex
within the broader matrix of media ecologies, should be understood as a
generative nodal point in the American system of racialized violence. Thought of
in the terms of the medium, the GIF’s specific materialities, its capacity for infinite
looping or the discourse of discretely compressed filed in which that loop is
stored, must be critically interrogated for their potential to amplify the circuitry of
dominating racialization that felicitously condition the GIF’s circulation. As a site
for the exchange, modulation, and brokerage of affect, the GIF has an influential
role in the economies of affect transited through media infrastructures. The
inability to foresee the content of the GIFs to which a subject may be
inadvertently exposed suggests that, under certain conditions, the experience of
unexpectedly encountering a symbolically GIF may elicit reactions at the most
deeply bodily level. To respond to, maintain, combat, and address these bodily
excitations is to perform labor in its affective form. That affective labor is always
already performed in a context of racialization, and that this racialization may be
12

vertiginously magnified by a GIF’s racist content, encourage an examination of
the GIF’s capacity to extract and expropriate the affective labor of its unwitting
conscripts.
The GIF will thus be shown to underscore the relationship between the
making-machine of Black bodies and the telos of American racism, the subjection
of those bodies to overkill. In his powerful meditation on the grotesque killings of
several queer youth across the United States, Stanley offers the notion of overkill
to bring into signification that which would seem to defy it, the capacity of
“excessive violence . . . [to push] a body beyond death.”16 Overkill is, for Stanley,
an analytic necessary to understand the gruesome murders of Lauryn Paige,
who was partially decapitated, and Rashawn Brazell, whose body was dissected
after he was murdered, because it locates this violence of overkill “precisely not
outside of, but [as] that which constitutes liberal democracy as such.”17 Overkill is
the violence that affirms the non-violence of liberal democratic equality; it codes
the necessity of sameness over difference and submission over resistance.
Thinking together the notion of overkill and the question of time, Stanley
argues that overkill indexes, symbolically and materially, a “temporality of
violence” altogether particular to its operation: “[The] biological time when the
heart stops pushing and pulling blood, yet the killing is not finished . . . [this
concurrence] suggests the aim is not simply the end of a specific life, but the

16

Eric Stanley, “Near Life, Queer Death: Overkill and Ontological Capture,” Social Text 29, no. 2
(2011): 9.
17
Ibid., 10.
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ending of all [differentially marked] life.”18 This move to end all differentially
marked life establishes the vicious force of “ontological capture,” a “space of
nonexistence . . . forged in the territory of inescapable violence . . . [which]
crystallizes the ontocorporeal, discursive, and material inscriptions that render
specific bodies in specific times as the place of the nothing.”19 It is this
reconfiguration of subjective specificity and particularity into a vast abyss of
nothing—an abyss of eternal sameness, endless repetition, a time that is not
time—that is at stake in the dissemination of GIFs produced through a logic of
digital minstrelsy.
My argument unfolds across the next three chapters. In Chapter 2, I
suggest that a deeper analytical avenue is opened by following Jackson’s
observation that GIFs of Black women are often the particular focus of the digital
minstrelsy she documents. I expand her critique by locating the proliferation of
GIFs caricaturing Black women within a broader social constellation underpinned
by logics of mammification, minstrelsy and making-machine. To do so, I turn to
the varied histories of the mammy figure as they relate to the practice of
blackface performance. I then offer an extensive engagement with the question
of the constitutive relationship between the figure of the minstrel and that of the
machine.
I then turn to an analysis of the GIF as a mediatic form in Chapter 3,
sketching out paradigms common in its critical appraisal as a digital media object
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and querying their possibilities and deficiencies. I focus my own analysis of the
GIF on the question of the loop, which I consider one of the fundamental aspects
of the GIF’s medium specificity and a key element of its constitutive work. I argue
that by tracing the circulation of racialized reaction GIFs the violent logic of
transforming Black subjects into machinic figurations can be rendered visible.
This process, what I call making-machine, is one that strips them of their
subjective particularity as it deploys them in an economy of racialization that
operates through dehumanization.
Making-machine is the site of ontological capture the racialized reaction
GIF institutes, and those Black subjects caught within its digital field become the
inhuman iconography of digital media creation. To substantiate this account of
the racializing properties of the GIF, I engage the image at the level of its
mediatic specificity and through questions of affective labor and its expropriation.
I contend that the mediatic properties of the GIF are central to its modulating
brokerage of affect, and it is this capacity to disperse infinitely differentiated
affective impulses that underpins the racialized reaction GIF’s making-machine of
Black women. The logic of making-machine is part of the core technologies of
racialized exclusion and violence. Its process is both a condition for the survival
of Black lives and the disciplinary technique that guarantees their exposure to
material and ontological violence. Making-machine, then, is situated in
irreconcilable relation to the process of making-human; the former
simultaneously affirms and negates the latter.
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To be certain, I am speaking about a particular context of GIF circulation
in the argument I propose. Following Jackson’s analytical lead, I emphasize the
(de)subjectifying work done by the GIF when it is circulated in one of its most
casual, putatively spontaneous scenes: that of the text-message exchange via
cellphone. Moreover, I am interested in directing my argument toward the explicit
relationship between the GIF, the casualness associated with its circulation, the
frequency with which its content implicates digital blackface, and the fortification
of white supremacist social mores. My discussion therefore narrows its
interrogative scope to the scene of GIF exchange between two non-Black
cellphone users—more specifically, between two white cellphone users. In the
text that follows, this context—the circulation of a GIF whose content implicates
racializing and violently racist caricature between two white persons—orients my
analytical efforts as their backdrop. Unless stated otherwise, this is the context
through which my analysis proceeds, and instances in which the racially
subordinating consequences of certain GIFs’ circulation are discussed take this
context as their referent.
Finally, it is to the specificity of the process of making-machine that I
return in Chapter 4, transposing these abstracted analytics onto the register of
the concrete in my discussion of a widely circulated GIF featuring Linnethia
Monique “NeNe” Leakes, a member of the cast of popular reality television show
The Real Housewives of Atlanta. Chapter 4 weaves together the historicized
braids of Chapter 2 with the theoretical propositions of Chapter 3; that is, it is an
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effort to carefully thread the concrete through the abstract and the abstract
through the concrete in a recursive, mutually formative mode.
Admittedly, the conclusions tentatively drawn in my consideration of one of
the most popular GIFs featuring Leakes will inevitably fail to fully account for
either the concrete or the abstract in their most robust forms. This is one
consequence of a methodological commitment to the maintenance of a
dialectical relation in its most taut coordinates, which refuses to submit to a
synthesis that would dissolve the vital differences between the conceptual
account of the GIF I have developed that account’s distinctive relevance to (and
insufficiency for) an analysis of Leakes’ coerced submission to the process of
making-machine. Instead, my hope is that this meditation on the question of
racialized reaction GIFs and the particularity of Leakes’ appropriation as those
GIFs’ content can be read through and against one another, pressing the
epistemological boundaries of the conceptual and the particular to their most
productive limits.
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CHAPTER 2
INTERLOCKING GENEALOGIES: THE MAMMY, THE MINSTREL, THE MACHINE, AND THE
PERFORMANCE OF DIGITAL BLACKFACE THROUGH THE REACTION GIF
In early August 2017, freelance journalist and doctoral student Lauren
Michele Jackson published “We Need to Talk about Digital Blackface in Reaction
GIFs” (“Digital Blackface”), an article which critically appraises the
disproportionate use (and misuse) of looping movement-images of Black men
and women as GIF content.1 Jackson perceives beyond the common refrain that
“digital behavior [as frivolous as GIF exchange] exists in a deracialized vacuum”
a failure to recognize the role of the hyperbolically racialized GIF in the
(re)production of “digital blackface.”2 The transfiguration of nineteenth-century
minstrel performance into a disembodying, byte-governed algorithm of reracialization, digital blackface describes “various types of minstrel performance
that become available in cyberspace . . . [by exploiting] the relative anonymity of
online identity to embody [B]lackness.”3 Historically, minstrel performance has
adopted racist caricatures and turned to histrionic, racist modes of theatrical
presentation to “put society’s most racist sensibilities on display and [feed] them
back to audiences to intensify these [racist sentiments] and disperse them across
cultures.”4
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Lauren Michele Jackson, “We Need to Talk about Digital Blackface in Reaction GIFs,” Teen
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While prior histories of minstrelsy worked through material embodiment
and a false logic of mimesis, digital blackface arguably operates through a more
seamless and inconspicuous transformation. To assume a fictive identity through
the practice of digital blackface is, as Jackson documents, a disturbingly common
phenomenon. Often coincident with the assumption of this fictive, racially marked
persona is an “excessive use of reaction GIFs with images of [B]lack people,”
which Jackson implicates as a mechanism integrated into the broader enterprise
of convincing digital audiences that the online identity bears an authentic, “realworld” counterpart in the form of an individual.5 Even in situations that do not
involve the construction and maintenance of a fabricated persona, the
tremendous velocity of mediatic exchange through online platforms structures a
circuitry of nearly instantaneous dialectical movement between the assumption
and refutation of Black identities. Equally paramount has been the integration of
GIFs into text-messaging applications, which has provided users with
unprecedented levels of access to such looping images and control over the
contexts of their deployment.
The broad object of Jackson’s analysis—the GIF—is not without its own
histories, of course. Moreover, the specific materiality of the GIF, the
“particularities of [its] mode of transmission, processing, and storage,” are
inescapably political and inseparable from histories of the image’s development
and deployment.6 The social, political, and historical contexts within which new

5
6

Ibid.
Jussi Parikka, What Is Media Archaeology? (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012), 36.

19

media forms emerge are conditioned by as well as condition, argues Jussi
Parikka, those “non-human elements which are integral to what constitutes” the
fields of modernity.7 Necessary, then, is a brief detour into the histories of the
GIF, differentiated contexts that will better illuminate the questions Jackson
investigates and, extending her analysis, I will pose.
Known fully as the Graphics Interchange Format, the GIF was first
developed in 1987 to facilitate the compression and transmission of static images
across low-speed Internet connections. Differentiating the GIF from other
common image formats such as the TIFF (Tagged Image File Format) or the
PNG (Portable Network Graphics) has long been its capacity to display a selfcontained animated scene on potentially endless repeat.8 Because of this
capacity for repetition, the content of animated GIFs is often referred to as a
“looping sequence.” The looping sequence, enabled by the GIF’s specific
technical structure, can successfully display “multiple frames on repeat [that are
stored] within the same image file without [requiring] the size (or resolution) of a
video [to play].”9 The animated GIF can be understood, in other words, as an
image file designed to sequentially encode multiple frames that, upon their
display, would run those frames “in order to make a moving image . . . through
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As James Ash usefully reminds us, the GIF’s technical structure enables it to display both static
images and animated sequences; it was the GIF’s capacity to display moving animation,
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flip-book style animation.”10 The GIF’s storage capacity made it ideal for
transmitting and embedding cinematic visual content, albeit of short duration, in a
technological moment of comparatively limited bandwidth and underdeveloped
video-editing software.11 Unlike video files, GIFs cannot support audio
transmission in addition to the looping movement-image sequence; no sound is
attached to the looping scene. As a consequence, it has become common
practice to append text to the bottom of GIF’s image-area; this text is, more often
than not, a transcription of what is said by the individuals who constitute the
GIF’s content.
The immediate popularity the GIF attained as a result of its utility in the
late 1980s was followed by a period of intensely contrasting absence. It would
not be until the mid-2000s, with the advent of websites such as MySpace,
LiveJournal, and Tumblr, that the pendulum of the GIF’s popularity would again
swing. The individualized customizability these new Internet platforms offered
users rekindled the GIF’s desirability, as the image’s small size, spectacular
content, and ease of use were ideal complements to these platforms’ ethos.12
The resurgence of the GIF was not simply a matter of these individuated
web platforms extending a digitally hospitable hand to the image. In their reading
of the GIF’s shifting horizons of popularity, Kate M. Miltner and Tim Highfield
suggest that the image’s return to visibility was profoundly aided “by the nostalgic
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proclivity of Internet culture groups for the banalities of the early web: dial-up
modems, cheesy Web 1.0 design, and 8-bit pixilation.” Articulations of the GIF as
integral to the “‘Internet Ugly’ aesthetic beloved by early users of the Internet”
and as the “file format of the Internet generation . . . our vinyl, our compact disk”
encourage an interpretation of the GIF as one of the many technological
junctures at which Marxism and Freudianism can be said to intersect.13 Marx’s
observation that capitalism demands an endless procurement of ever-expanding
volumes of resources exemplifies a kind of Oedipalized lust of a Freudian ilk; that
which semiotically codes the “better” as the “new” cannot orient its teleologically
progressive desire for new modes of consumption without rooting itself in the
binaristic flip that codes the “worse” as the “old.” The compact file size of the GIF
enables it to support a variety of looping movement-images and complementary
snippets of text. Although this looping sequence of mediatic information is filtered
through the contextual sieve of the new—the GIF no longer inhabits MySpace or
LiveJournal but iMessage, Twitter, and Facebook—it is the GIF’s “primitive”
design that secures the continued possibility of its image-information economy.

Considering the Critique of “Digital Blackface in Reaction GIFs”
Having introduced the major thematics of Jackson’s argument and
provided a contextualizing history of the object of her analysis, I would like to
pause here in order to recount in more exacting detail my interpretation of
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Jackson’s argument, that is, what I understand to be the specific phenomena her
text exhumes and the relations shared by those phenomena. Jackson’s
discussion of digital minstrelsy is, I believe, intended to address at least two
intertwined and, thus, co-emergent processes of racialization-cum-subordination.
The first is the assumption of a fictional online identity that congeals through its
recourse to American histories of minstrel performance writ large; to substantiate
the real-world legitimacy of such an identity, an individual—almost always, a nonBlack individual—deploys reaction GIFs whose content is interpreted to signify a
hyperbolic moment of racialized performance.
The reaction GIF, a subset of the GIF genre, is specifically named by
Jackson and demonstrated to be emblematic of the racializing work of which the
GIF is capable. Reaction GIFs are, like GIFs as an image category, infinitely
looping scenes; what merits the qualifier “reaction” is this subset’s frequent
representation of “bodies in motion, primarily excerpted from recognizable pop
culture moments . . . [and often] used to express common ideas and emotions.”14
Although the interpersonal intelligibility of a reaction GIF is determined at least by
the context of its transmission,15 as well as by an individual’s relative familiarity
with the cultural references through which the GIF legibly signifies,16 the reaction
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GIF has been consistently hailed as among the most discursively potent of the
image’s forms. According to Jason Eppink, the Associate Curator of Digital Media
at the New York City Museum of the Moving Image, reaction GIFs are uniquely
able to “communicate more nuance and concision than their verbal
translations.”17 Rephrased within the register of Jackson’s argument, reaction
GIFs’ easy modulation of verbal lexicons imbues them with a signifying flexibility
and gestural potency; these images can heighten the violence of racialization
and disavow their complicity with such a system in a selfsame instantaneous
moment. Correspondingly, appeals to such reaction GIFs, as the logic of digital
minstrelsy in its individuated form would suggest, consolidate the authenticity of
the fictive identity, extinguishing suspicions of misrepresentation by marking the
content of the GIF and the content of the digital identity as substantively
metonymic.
The second practice, which is indissociably bound to the first insofar as
each is reciprocally generative of the other, is the casual deployment of GIFs,
primarily through cellphone text-messaging systems, whose content is almost
exclusively Black faces to communicate responsorial hyperbole—hyperbole that
is indelibly constituted by and through racist tropes of minstrel performance and
“our cultural propensity [to] see [B]lack people as walking hyperbole.”18 Jackson
is unambiguous about her turn to this structural level of personal-impersonal
practice and its requisite differentiation from atomistic events of digital minstrelsy:
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If there’s one thing the Internet thrives on, it’s hyperbole, and the
overrepresentation of [B]lack people GIFing everyone’s daily crises plays
up enduring perceptions and stereotypes about [B]lack express. And when
[non-Black] users flock to these images, they are playacting within those
stereotypes in a manner reminiscent of an unsavory American tradition.
Reaction GIFs are mostly frivolous and fun. But when [B]lack people are
the go-to choice for [non-Black] users to act out their most hyperbolic
emotions, do reaction GIFs become “digital blackface”?19
As a critical hermeneutic, digital blackface does not address the thorny
problematic of intention; rather, as Jackson plainly expounds, it telescopes with
necessary precision the violent act of inhabiting a Black persona. It is thus no
surprise that among the most popular search terms for reaction GIFs are “generic
search[es] like ‘funny [B]lack kid [GIF]’ or ‘[B]lack lady [GIF].’”20
In a further exposure of the racializing algorithmic logic that governs GIFhosting websites, Jackson notes that when the latter phrase—“[B]lack lady
[GIF]”—is queried within the search engine available on Giphy, a popular online
GIF repository, the website “offers several additional suggestions, such as ‘Sassy
Black Lady,’ ‘Angry Black Lady,’ and ‘Black Fat Lady’ to assist users in narrowing
down their search.”21 Set against the dizzying number of GIFs transmitted
through online platforms daily (in 2016, for example data collected by Giphy
indicated the Facebook Messenger users were sending approximately 25,000
GIFs per minute through the platform; in October of that year, Giphy announced
that its catalogue exceeded 1 billion images and that it was directly serving over
100 million users daily), the relationship between Giphy’s algorithmic
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encouragement, the minstrelized racialization circuited through GIF transmission,
and the pernicious calcification of racist tropes is made newly visible.22 These
interconnected processes are able to fold into one another and mutually subsist
through their internal differentiation and adaptation to the evolving contexts of
racialization. This folding inward, however, is complemented and augmented a
collective folding outward, whereby each racializing formation functions to
subtend the omnipresent and socially saturating system of racial hierarchy
characteristic of the United States’ social order.
How, then, to think the ramifications of racialized reaction GIFs
transversally, thereby bridging the structural and the capillary without diminishing
or distorting either? An interesting, as well as symbolic, method can be culled by
reading synthetically the propositions that respectively inaugurate and conclude
Jackson’s meditation. Opening her article with a remark on GIFs’ undeniable
presence within the social worlds of the Internet, Jackson then indexes the
curious representational field that will be the subject of her critique: “But even a
casual observer of GIFing would notice that, as with much of online culture,
[B]lack people appear at the center of it all. Or images of [B]lack people, at
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least.”23 As she approaches the conclusion of her argument, however, the
undifferentiated sociality of “online culture” is filtered through an optics of
particularity, one informed by histrionic performances so often transformed into
the content of reaction GIFs: “Ultimately, [B]lack people and [B]lack images are
thus relied upon to perform a huge amount of emotional labor online on behalf of
[non-Black] users. . . . Intertwine this proliferation of our images with the others
we’re as likely to see—death, looped over and over—and the Internet becomes
an exhausting experience.”24 Situated in immediate dialectical relation to one
another, these statements locate the racializing force of the GIF at the level of
techno-material, affective precision and at the register of an epistemologically
aspirational approach to totality in the form of Internet culture.25 The GIF thus
becomes a molecular instance of racializing subordination whose efficacy is
conditioned by a molar social order of racism.
The purpose of Jackson’s intervention is, broadly described, diagnostic
and prescriptive. Recognizing the circulation of racialized reaction GIFs within
larger constellations of racist economies, Jackson questions why the use of GIFs
featuring Black men or women in decontextualized, caricatured representations
can feel so seemingly intuitive and innocuous. Her concern is with the
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expectation of emotional labor onto Black persons whose momentary
expressions—expressions often captured under situations of purposeful, rather
than purportedly “natural,” exaggeration—are transformed into infinitely looping
sequences to be parodied. This exportation swiftly recalibrates into exploitation,
amplifying its already violent potentiality. By this, I mean to suggest that the
reaction GIF of the Black subject is only able to perform this exported emotional
labor because of a prior sociocultural logic that reads Black embodiment as
assuredly viable content for racist theatricality; in turn, this hermeneutical racism
performs an exportation of its own, disseminating that transformed content as
irrefutable evidence of the “natural” excess and pathology of Black behavior.
Extensions of the critical possibilities opened by Jackson’s text are
promisingly numerous. Brief mention is made, for instance, of the hypervisibility
of Black femmes and women as the content of reaction GIFs, although this
observation is not further pursued. Its provocation, nevertheless, indexes the
analytical potential of triangulating the imbricated processes of racialization,
gender-sex materialization, and sexualization to more precisely interrogate the
GIF’s role in constituting the social. Another suspended reserve of critical
potential arises at the conclusion of the text with Jackson’s characterization of
the reaction GIFs’ racializing work as the extraction of Black persons’ emotional
labor. Jackson does not maintain, however, that the labor so siphoned is
exclusively delimited by the emotional field. Accordingly, whether the character of
this extracted labor can or should be understood in alternative and additional
ways remains an unanswered question.
28

With this said, I would like to propose three inquiries that constructively
respond to and extend Jackson’s analysis of the reaction GIF; these three
questions will orient my subsequent discussion of the constitutive braiding
between the GIF and racialization as a process of subject-formation. First, what
logic subtends the dissemination of GIFs caricaturing and dehumanizing Black
women and those GIFs’ cultural omnipresence? Phrased alternatively, how can
the reaction GIF be situated within a genealogy of blackface minstrelsy,
particularly with regard to the figure of the mammy, the enslaved Black woman
whose status as subject is forcibly entangled with her willing submission to
enslaving whites? It is to this question that I will respond in the remainder of this
chapter’s discussion. Second, how does the mediatic specificity of the reaction
GIF—the stylization of its content, its capacity for infinite repetition, its truncated
temporality, the ease with which it can be exchanged—aid and abet an extraction
of Black women’s affective labor? This transition from emotion to affect enables
an analysis of the GIF’s extractive operations more attuned to the psychic,
corporeal, and intersubjective violences of sexualized racialization and racialized
sexualization.26 Third, how might this critical engagement with affective labor and

26

The subjectifying field intended by the locution “sexualized racialization and racialized
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the GIF’s mediatic specificity illuminate the symbolic relations between the
figures of the mammy, the minstrel, and the machine? That is, how does the
circulation of racialized reaction GIFs work through the genealogical currents of
mammification and minstrelization to conduct the making-machine of Black
women? What are the consequences of and constraints imposed by this makingmachine for the subject interpellated as a Black woman? What becomes of her
subjective particularity, of her capacity to recognize herself (and be recognized
by others) as ontologically commensurate with the status of human? These latter
two inquiries will build on the analysis presented below and will be substantively
engaged in the discussion’s next and final chapters.

Mammification, Minstrelization, and the Racializing Epistemology of the GIF
Endearing, gruff, cantankerous, strong, spirited, fiercely independent,
unapologetic, incisively observant—the innumerable representational forms
demanded of GIFs of Black women bear an uneasy resonance with many of the
attributes of an iconic figure of the antebellum South, the mammy. Is there a
sexualization as immanent to biopolitical analysis but seldom situate the two fields as reciprocally
constitutive and indissociably intertwined.
Rather than continue this pattern of mutual exclusion, Puar understands racialization and
sexualization to be coextensive technologies, and, as a result, the disaggregation of “exceptional
queer subjects from queer racialized populations in contemporary U.S. politics” can be mapped
onto “the tension between biopolitics and necropolitics.” Ibid., 35. The suffusion of her analytical
optic with a concurrently operative sexual-racial regulatory script enables Puar to refuse the
corresponding methodological maneuver that usually dislocates the biopolitical from the
necropolitical. As Puar states, “This bio-necro collaboration conceptually acknowledges
biopower’s direct activity in death, while remaining bound to the optimization of life, and
necropolitics’ nonchalance toward death even as it seeks out killing as its primary aim.” Ibid. The
imbrication of biopolitics and necropolitics that Puar proposes is intrinsic to the logic of makingmachine, which refuses to explicitly acknowledge the demarcation of Black bodies as imperative
sites of death by proliferating the ruse that submission to the bodily inertia of machinic subjectivity
will inoculate Black subjects against state and social violence.
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relationship between the ascendant popularity of GIFs featuring Black women
and the multiple legacies of the mammy, the latter of which, in its constitutive
conductivity, might be thought as the logics of mammification?
I want to suggest that one form of this contemporary logic of
mammification can be seen in the frequent exchange of reaction GIFs whose
content features Black women performing decontextualized scenes of hyperbolic
excess. Moreover, I contend that this logic of mammification works through and
alongside proliferations of digital minstrelsy, and that both figures—that of the
mammy and that of the minstrel—are generatively embedded within larger
discursive formations which braid together notions of the mammy, the minstrel,
and the machine. Through the durative extractions of Black women’s affective
labor maintained by the circulation of racialized reaction GIFs, a process of
making-machine manifests, one that strips Black women of their subjective
particularity by denying them the possibility of recognition within the ontological
status of the human.

On the Logic of Mammification.
In her Mammy: A Century of Race, Gender, and Southern Memory,
Kimberly Wallace-Sanders opines that “the mammy figure looms over the
American imagination as a cultural influence so pervasive[ly] . . . because it both
shapes and is shaped by a consciousness that is uniquely American.”27 The
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lexical presence of the term “mammy,” Wallace-Sanders ably documents,
solidified by the mid-nineteenth century, most notably in the American South.28
The term’s continued resonance, however, bespeaks the racializing mythos of
which the mammy has been differentially symbolic across American spacetimes.29 To better methodologically attend to the diverse histories of the mammy
figure, Wallace-Sanders develops her analysis through a meticulously reflexive
balancing of historical and contemporary interpretations of the mammy figure.
The histories of American racism and their cooperative efforts with essentializing
gender mythology are never foreclosed in the presented account. Nevertheless,
Wallace-Sanders does not deny that any effort of historical reconstruction
involves a displacement of present onto past and past onto present; she instead
seeks to understand how diversely positioned reifications of the mammy figure
have shaped American racial imaginaries both historically and in the present.
Synthesizing the myriad descriptions of the mammy figure, WallaceSanders offers the following characterization as its most recognizable iteration,
an embodiment of extremity and exaggeration:
Mammy’s body is grotesquely marked by excess: she is usually extremely
overweight, very tall, broad-shouldered; her skin is nearly black. She
manages to be a jolly presence—she often sings or tells stories while she
works—and a strict disciplinarian at the same time. . . . Mammy is often
both her title and the only name she has ever been given. . . . Mammy
wields considerable authority without the plantation household and
28
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consequently retains a measure of dubious, unreliable respect in the slave
quarters; many slaves consider her untrustworthy because she allegedly
identifies so completely with the culture that oppresses them.30
The defining psychic, corporal, and socially positional attributes Wallace-Sanders
locates in depictions of the mammy figure have translated into the unfolding
present in the form of a “controlling image,” what Patricia Hill Collins defines as
an iteratively produced ideological framing of Black women “designed to make
racism, sexism, poverty, and other forms of social injustice appear to be natural,
normal, and inevitable parts of [Black women’s] everyday life.”31
For Collins, the pernicious legacy of the mammy figure is its subjectifying
primacy as the “first controlling image” through which Black women are forcibly
filtered and regulated.32 It is the violently maintained tenacity of this controlling
image that ensures the continued “mammification” of Black women—their de
facto treatment as mammy figures by white persons and the penalizing discipline
to which they are subjected should they fail to appear deferential to and nurturing
of elite whites.33 Collins’ magisterial explication of the interwoven ubiquity of the
mammy figure across American social, cultural, and political registers
unflinchingly illustrates the figure’s symbolic function in maintenance of American
racism and racialization. She identifies the mammy figure as a generative nexus
for the reproduction of racialized sexuality and sexualized racism, and it is by
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implicating these multiple sites of social disqualification that the mammy figure
can continue to exercise its disciplinary power as a controlling image.
Following these analyses, the logic of mammification may be understood
as exhibiting several different tenets, with the relentless injunction that Black
women position themselves in service to non-Black persons as especially
axiomatic. This logic contends that through such service and self-sacrifice (the
latter of which manifests as coerced self-debasement) the mammified Black
woman will experience a serene joy and satisfaction. It is necessary to note,
however, that the logic of mammification is not per se coextensive with the
symbolic operations of the mammy figure. Although the mammy image cannot
and does not fully determine Black women’s behavior, it effects an indelible
impression on Black women’s bodies, akin to what Hortense Spillers has named
a “hieroglyphics of the flesh.”34
The logic of mammification I am proposing cannot be advanced outside its
own historicity; to intertwine the mammy figure with the exchange of GIFs of
Black women by non-Black persons requires parsing out the genealogical
histories of practices involving the performance of Blackness and, specifically, of
Black womanhood.35 To this end, the historiographical work of Micki McElya is
especially valuable. In Clinging to Mammy: The Faithful Slave in Twentieth34
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Century America, McElya endeavors to produce an account of slavery’s histories
that could explain how narratives of “the slave as a faithful and loving dependent,
of which the mammy was the most popular representation, [came to] drench[]
American culture and politics throughout the twentieth century and persist to this
day.”36 The narrative of the faithful slave achieved its revisionist efficacy through
the generation of nostalgia for a romantic antebellum South that never was; the
veneration of the mammy figure represented a particular technology in the
production of this alternative historical account. Although the forms taken by this
revisionist propaganda were varied, McElya devotes significant attention to a
theatrical scene unusually common at the beginning of the twentieth century—
white women engaging in “professional and amateur impersonations of enslaved
[B]lack women on stages and in living rooms, whether for historical
presentations, for shared amusement, to raise funds for favorite causes, or for
pay.”37
White women were arguably the nation’s primary producers and
consumers of the faithful slave narrative (and its concomitant mammy tropes) in
the early twentieth century. These women would author textual archives of letters
subsequently presented as exchanges between women and their mammies;
these letters, though written exclusively by white women, depicted a sentimental
intimacy whose intensity traded on a fictive bond mendaciously presented as an
authentic relation between a white woman and her loving mammy. Often, the
36
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retrospective wish that these epistolary narratives expressed—notwithstanding
the abundance of sublimated erotic desire for Black women’s bodies dripping off
their pages—was that “nothing could have been more precious to enslaved
[B]lack people than their white charges.”38
Just as these written manifestos shaped white women’s nostalgic longings
for a return to the false history of the faithful slave, they would be unexpectedly
shaped by these women’s experiences with segregation, war, and social
upheaval. The primacy of textual production in the form of epistolary archives
would give way to more substantively embodied performances of blackface
minstrelsy, frequently in the form of racial masquerade and dialect reading. It was
through the assumption of “the role of the [B]lack mammy” that a white woman
was able “to reinforce her own [racial and class] status.”39 It was through
simulation of the Black mammy, a simulation that was paradoxically regarded as
more authentic than the fictional mammy figure on which the performance was
based, that vectors of class, race, and gender could be stabilized during the
tumultuous first decades of the twentieth century.
The figuration of Black women as always already mammies is, in effect,
the evacuation of Black women’s infinite subjective particularity. Its operation is
intergenerational, moving through and upon the violence of slavery, segregation,
discrimination, disenfranchisement, and social precarity. Dehumanizing
abstraction produced the mammy figure, and, in turn, for that figure to mark the
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bodies of Black women, this process of abstraction needed to again transpire.
Rachel Alicia Griffin writes of mammification in a similar vein, positing it as a
technique for the construction of stereotypical narratives of Black women in
contemporary contexts that, when achieved, dissolves the specificity of Black
women’s individual lives. Mammified representations of Black women in a
purportedly post-racial social and political order, one in which Black women can
ably accrue capital and widely experience the promises of liberty, are, Griffin
piercingly observes, nonetheless “replete with [portrayals of] servitude,
obedience, self-sacrifice, caretaking, domesticity, and an allegiance to white
people and white culture.”40

On the Question of Minstrelsy and Making-Machine.
The mammy performances McElya scrupulously archives can be
productively situated within the broader genealogy of blackface minstrelsy of
which the racialized reaction GIF is a contemporary iteration. Indeed, Jackson
develops an isomorphic argument in her “Digital Blackface” when addressing the
diffuse mobility of racialized-cum-racist performance through the circulation of
specific reaction GIFs. The minstrelizing preoccupations of mammy
performances, though formalistically different from racialized reaction GIFs and
ostensibly oriented toward unrelated ends, cannot be adequately scrutinized
without querying their constitutive connection to the latter—as well as the
40
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constitutive connection of blackface minstrelsy to the notion of the machine. The
histories of American slavery and plantation economies, suggests Louis ChudeSokei, hermetically sealed “the relationship between [B]lacks and machines and
expressed [that relationship] in performance via blackface minstrelsy.”41 Because
Chude-Sokei’s brilliant exposition of the intertwined legacies of the blackface
minstrel and the machine-robot is exceedingly illustrative of the argument I have
been developing thus far, I pause here to offer a brief interpretation of his text so
as to situate it in dialogue with the specificity of my own intervention.
“The Uncanny History of Minstrels and Machines, 1835–1923” (“Uncanny
History”), Chude-Sokei’s contribution to the anthology Burnt Cork: Traditions and
Legacies of Blackface Minstrelsy, endeavors to exhume the complexly
intertwined histories of race, technology, Blackness, industrialization, and empire
in the American modernist era. This sprawling list of analytics belies the intensive
interconnections Chude-Sokei nimbly traces between them; what begins as an
impossibly broad and apparently irreducible conceptual cartography is shown to
be a conductive nexus of overlapping, contradictory, and interwoven social
processes. Parsing this dense core into its elementary patterns, Chude-Sokei
isolates two primary clusters of meaning fundamental to American modernism.
The first he terms the “machine aesthetic, [which was] produced by and through
the West’s difficult and ambivalent responses to industrialization, and which
would ultimately find its political and social fulfillment in an America that
41
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announces its global presence via the language of inevitably, the language of the
new.”42 The promise of industrialization in the latter portion of the nineteenth
century inaugurated new possibilities of domination over land and the American
frontier—that vital American reserve of the natural. Industrialization’s slow
transformation of nature into industry, however, was greeted with ambivalence
and frustration. These affective anxieties sublimated in the form of a heightened
nostalgia for an American nature, imagined to be unadulterated and not yet
foreclosed by the insatiable hunger of industry.
The incongruence of this desire for an untouched natural with
industrialization’s commandeering flow was symbolically transposed onto the
enslaved African body, largely “because of the African slave’s central function
deep within those very notions of ‘nature’ and nostalgia.”43 The presumed
intimacy of the racialized (that is, African) body with nature, as well as race’s
prominent role in the process of modernization and the cultural experiences of
modernity, gesture toward the second cluster of meaning-making in modernity,
what Chude-Sokei calls the “African aesthetic.”44 The contradictory plurality of the
locution “African aesthetic” intends to gesture toward the multiply imposed
“metonymic relationships between and among [B]lacks and their varied cultural
products during and after slavery . . . [and how] these constructs ultimately
manifested a complex set of relationships with [their] dialectical other:
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technology, industry, [or] civilization.”45 Proper management of the anxieties
inadvertently forged in the industrial crucible required flexibility between the
categorical markers “race” and “machine,” “would require strategic moments
when the two blend and pass for each other rather than function as the
antinomies they did and still do represent.”46 Chude-Sokei thus writes: “In
analyzing these two clusters and historicizing their fundamentally modern
influence on each other, what we then find in the nineteenth century are two of
the twentieth century’s most distinct products facing and doubling each other: the
blackface minstrel and the robot.”47
Much like the historical accounts of the mammy discussed above, ChudeSokei locates plantation slavery and its legacies as the source of blackface
minstrelsy and the racist popular culture it would spawn. Prior to the “birth” of
modernity, it was the plantation economy that “sealed the relationship between
[B]lacks and machines and expressed it in performance via blackface
minstrelsy.”48 The plantation’s regimented disciplinarity was a structural precursor
to the formal, temporally bounded, and depersonalizing labor systems of Fordism
and Taylorism. The automation of those subsequent systems of mass production
was already visible in the plantation’s aspiration toward machinic, routinized
production. It is therefore unsurprising, Chude-Sokei observes, that whites
seeking to escape industrialization’s effacement of the individuated laborer would
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turn to minstrelsy performance in the form of an “always flexible and always
performative ‘African Aesthetic’ . . . as distinct from whiteness and ‘the West.’”49
Indeed, at the turn of the twentieth century, the contested position of the Black
subject as neither human nor animal but something altogether elsewhere
translated as a kind of liminality. This symbolic aperture came to incorporate the
idea of machinic production as indicative of a machinic body, which was, in fact,
not a “body” at all. To relationally experience that body is to be forced to address
its signification of the uncanny, its machinic potential to colonize the colonizing
white subject through the automatism it masks as its nature.
Chude-Sokei’s turn to the Freudian uncanny as “the space of
epistemological uncertainty and cultural anxiety where the minstrel meets the
machine” is driven by the historical transition from plantation-based economies of
enslavement to increasing possibilities of Black migration and labor
diversification.50 In the context of American slavery and in the legacy of blackface
minstrelsy, the uncanny inscribes the particular anxiety felt when a thing (the
Black subject) deceptively presents itself as a person. During the era of
plantation slavery and its (still) violent aftermath, “this slippage occurs when a
designated thing dares assert itself as a person via mimicry of ‘human’ codes,
thereby suggesting the capacity for reason, for literacy, and [for] kinship.”51 The
liminal ontological position of the Black subject, agonizingly amplified by adaptive
relations of domination at the turn of the twentieth century, was preserved in its
49
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ambiguity through recourse to blackface minstrelsy and the racialized figures it
congealed. Minstrelsy persisted in the effort to maintain the Black body as a
capacious, romanticized, and romanticizing sign of an antebellum past, an
industrializing present, and a technologically promising future. The cultural forms
that dispersed throughout the beginning decades of the twentieth century, many
taken to typify the modernist moment, deeply linked to that figure of the machinic
minstrel, who would remain at the core of the discursive and economic effects
that are American mass media and popular culture.”52
The purpose of my extensive, granular mapping of the discursive
maneuvers made in “Uncanny History” has been in foundational anticipation of
my own argument. To briefly review, my claim is that, building upon Jackson’s
analysis in “Digital Blackface,” the circulation of reaction GIFs whose content
features hyperbolic caricatures of Black women works through the genealogical
currents of mammification and minstrelsy to further alienate Black women from
recognition within the ontological category of the human. To justify my positioning
the GIF within these genealogical legacies, I turned to the diverse histories of
those two conceptual personae, the mammy and the minstrel; in so doing, I
sought to historicize the relation of the GIF-qua-digital-minstrelsy to these two
figures.
More pointedly, my objective was to propose that the mammy and the
minstrel can be historicized in their relationship to and with the concept of the
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machine, whereby the transition of minstrelsy to digital or “technological” form
was not seen as aberrant or discontinuous but rather as emerging within an
internally differentiated historical field of the making-machine of Black bodies.
“Uncanny History” tracks the braiding of minstrel and machine but does not
address the figure of the mammy; the rich literature on the history of the mammy
figure I examined, though clear in its connecting the mammy and the minstrel, did
not address the figure of the machine.
Read collectively, however, these diverse accounts suggest a thick point
of intersection between these three symbols, one that provocatively attests to
what I will call the making-machine of Black women. As I will argue below, the
process of making-machine is the process of desubjectification through coercive,
iterative submission to automation; it is a method by which a subject, one whose
embodied particularity threatens the vitality of economies of domination, is
stripped of her subjectivity, that is, the very embodied particularity that should
guarantee the recognition of her personhood. The circulation of reaction GIFs
whose content depicts Black women through racist hyperbole is a constitutive
mechanism of the desubjectifying process of making-machine. Through its
extraction of Black women’s affective labor and its integration of Black women
into escapable, repetitive loops, the reaction GIF pervasively diffuses its makingmachine logic. Although attempts disavow the violent racialization the GIF effects
often appeal to its hyper-truncated duration, it is in fact the GIF’s abridged yet
endless temporality that is of peculiar importance to the dominating relation
instituted by the process of making-machine.
43

On the Concretized Object and the Transversal Analytic.
Within the abstracting processes of mammification, minstrelization, and
making-machine I have discussed, I have proposed heuristics with which to
evaluate the social relationality of GIF exchange that themselves appear to work
through additional maneuvers of abstraction and reification. I note this to
explicitly acknowledge the methodological problematic that manifests in
consequence: The analytical movements transited by these heuristics hazard
dehumanization and depersonalization in their own right.
Informing this methodological risk, as well as, I hope, justifying it, is the
critical promise expressed in Kevin Floyd’s syncretic exegesis of a queer Marxist
hermeneutic in his Reification of Desire: Toward a Queer Marxism. There, Floyd
offers a queered reading of the Marxist method of theorizing social totalities
through his injection of desire into the dialectical movement of the concrete and
the abstract. Desire provides a motor for the internal differentiation of an abstract
unity whose subsequent reconsolidation resists a return to abstraction through
the proliferation of specific, concretized social relations. As a result, the
“specification of concepts and objects and the specification of totality [become]
inseparable.”53
What I understand Floyd’s queer reading of Marxist method to offer is a
reminder of the imperative to maintain a taut dialectical relation between a
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concrete object of analysis and the abstract social-relational totality to which it is
transversally connected. Bringing Floyd’s insights to bear on this discussion, my
argument’s theoretical foundation, situated at an abstracted, broad register, must
now be subjected to the dialectical pressure of a concrete object of analysis
against which such theoretical overtures can be evaluated. However, in the
absence of that foundation, one that is informed by the diverse histories of the
objects and concepts under scrutiny, such an analysis would fail to account for
the very abstracting processes it seeks to reveal. Insofar as the concrete object
of my analysis is the racialized reaction GIF, I turn to an example cited by
Jackson as representative of digital minstrelsy: a “GIFed” scene from the popular
reality television show The Real Housewives of Atlanta (RHOA).
One of several television programs composing the Housewives series,
RHOA follows the lives of several affluent women (the so-called “housewives,”
though many have established, lucrative careers that seldom exist alongside the
kind of labor the term might otherwise connote) in the Atlanta area. Many
members of the cast, which has consisted almost always exclusively of Black
women, have developed notable celebrity profiles, though none is arguably more
widely known than long-term cast member Linnethia Monique “NeNe” Leakes.
Leakes rose to the heights of television celebrity due to her multi-season tenure
on RHOA, which remains in production. Leakes’ appearances on the program
were recognizable for showcasing her no-nonsense, unapologetically confident,
and endlessly witty personality. Like other reality television programs, RHOA cast
members would frequently be asked to comment on the events transpiring within
45

their social circle in “confessional scenes.” Such scenes involve a cast member
appearing alone and speaking in monologue form directly into the recording
camera. Edited in such a way as to imply that their content derives from the
seemingly extemporaneous, candid reactions of cast members to the segment’s
plots, confessional scenes appeal to a sense of intimacy fictively generated by
their formalistic elements. In such scenes, cast members are presented as
expressing their most authentic and “unfiltered” thoughts.54 That directors,
producers, other cast members, and crew members likely surround the
“confessing” individual cannot be acknowledged; instead, the confessional
encourages the willful suspension of disbelief, the efficacy of which is largely
secured by these scenes’ frequent appearance across reality television programs
and their adoption of the same formalistic elements.
Leakes’ confessional scenes, known for their incisive commentary and
seemingly frank observations, became Internet sensations, regularly the subject
of “viral” reproduction and dissemination across social media platforms. These
scenes underwent such frequent transformation into GIF content that those
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charged with the management of RHOA’s branding created an account under the
show’s name on Giphy, the online GIF repository. Of the many GIFs featuring
Leakes available on Giphy (a search of her stage name, “NeNe Leakes,” yields
over 1,500 results on the website), I would like to mention one particular
confessional-scene-turned-GIF, created and uploaded to Giphy in November
2015. This GIF features Leakes in a confessional scene, responding to an
interaction between members of the RHOA cast. Leakes is seen irreverently
throwing her right hand into the air and stating, “The shade, honey. I liveee [sic],”
the textual transcription of which is appended to the GIF’s bottom.55 The putative
intimacy and contrived privacy of Leakes’ confessional statement—functioning as
an invitation to those in the audience to join her in a joke that, by virtue of its
secret transmission, only she and they will be able to subsequently appreciate—
seemingly mimes the logic of the epistolary “mammy” archives, wherein the
production of excessive emotional attachment, itself always conditioned on the
privacy of the discursive exchange, became the guarantor of the archives’
legitimacy.
According to Giphy, the GIF of Leakes, simply called “NeNe Leakes
Shade GIF,” has been viewed almost 50 million times since its addition to
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Giphy’s catalogue at the end of 2015. This figure, notably, does not include the
number of times the GIF has been retrieved from Giphy and then disseminated
through unconnected platforms (e.g., if the GIF is downloaded to a personal
computer and then shared from that computer, this would not affect Giphy’s
recorded number of views). The figure also does not represent the number of
times the looping sequence itself has been witnessed. This is because, as Giphy
explains, its view-counting mechanism registers a single-unit increase in views
(e.g., from one view to two views) each time a GIF is shared (rather than each
time it is shared as well as each time it completes its animated sequence). Said
otherwise, an GIF’s view count is not affected by the number of times it repeats
its content by virtue of remaining within the visible boundaries of a particular
digital interface.56 Moreover, this figure includes no internally differentiating
statistics about its use. That is to say, Giphy provides no information about the
contexts of those 50 million views, meaning that there is no effective way to
determine the sites of the image’s most frequent circulation. As with any brute
quantification, the figure flattens out difference, and it cannot be assumed that
each of those views was an instance of violently subordinating racialization, an
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instance matching the context of GIF circulation that serves as the analytical
backdrop of my analysis. It is entirely plausible and likely the case that among
those 50 million views are countless instances of Black cellphone users
marshaling the GIF to subvert its racially subordinating imagery. This form of
subversive use, effectively a caricaturing of the caricature, must not be
discounted as unrelated to the broader analytical queries my discussion
implicates. However, insofar as my objective here is to root out and expressly
identify the instances in which the circulation of GIFs featuring Leakes fortify a
white supremacist order of things, I regrettably do not attend to this vital question
of subversion.
Returning to the specific GIF of Leakes mentioned above, I would like to
briefly employ Giphy’s rigid quantification formula to consider the relationship
between views and looped playbacks. The approximately three-quarters of a
second the image takes to complete a single playback, when couched in broader
temporal units, yields the following figures: in a one-minute period, the GIF
completes its looping sequence around eighty times; in slightly more than a fiveminute period, the GIF completes its looping sequence more than four hundred
times. In neither instance, however, would the number of completed loops result
in an equivalent increase in the number of “views” associated with the GIF.
Whether the image repeats eighty times or eight hundred times, the formula
registers an increase of one in the GIF’s registered number of views, as “view” is
in fact an index of deployment, that is, an approximate quantification of the
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instances in which the GIF is retrieved from Giphy and shared through a digitalcommunication platform.
In brief review, I have thus far argued that the process of mammification
functions as a constitutive social logic that can readily adapt in response to the
maintenance needs of historically specific economies of racism. I have also
contended that blackface minstrelsy, of which the early twentieth-century
“mammy” performances are a central facet, was a primary technology through
which perceptions of the Black body were successfully bound to images of the
machinic automaton. The synthetic alchemy that wove together the Black body
and the machine functioned to absolve a white-supremacist American social
order of its grievous moral failure. That is, to assert that American whitesupremacist ideologies, institutions, and embodied practices cohered around the
dehumanization of Black lives was to proclaim the logic of the necessarily
illogical: How could the not-human ever be subject to dehumanization, be made
to lose something “it” never had? Access to the very ontological category of
personhood was contingent on the successful interpellation of an individual body
as a person, of a human figure as figured properly human. This tautological
politics of recognition coalesced with the alchemical production of the machinic
Black body; the consequence of their imbrication was the convenient foreclosure
of the any possible interrogation of the moral failure this political-discursive union
signified.
Thinking these two arguments together alongside the GIF, I would assert
that the infinitely looping movement-image of Leakes’ grandiose reaction
50

represents a contemporary, discrete, and interlocking moment of the intersection
between mammy, minstrel, and machine. The hyperbole for which Leakes is
known and from which her celebrity derives becomes the means through which
she is derisively caricatured in an endlessly repeating scene. Of the hundreds of
GIFs whose content comprises Leakes’ varied reactions to the dramatic
exchanges of the RHOA cast, dozens have view counts in excess of several
million. In turn, it is not implausible to imagine that Leakes’ arrested dynamism,
her quotidian reactions forcibly looped within an exploitative frame, her less-thana-second of living, has been made to repeat several hundred million times. The
relationship Leakes may have had (or may be abstracted to have had) with the
notion of personhood prior to this “GIFing” has corroded in its wake; the hollow
splicing and reproduction of her most allegedly “outrageous” moments would
seem able to entertain only in the aftermath of this infinite loss. This is the
characteristic form of the process of making-machine.
What remains, then, is first to interrogate the imbrication of the GIF and
the process of making-machine, an enterprise situated at the register of the
conceptual. Next is to weave the analytic yield of the former inquiry together with
this concrete object of scrutiny, the incessantly proliferating cadre of GIFs whose
content is the looping hyperbole ascribed to the persona of NeNe Leakes. This
will also require a broader conceptual account of the GIF’s racializing, extractive
mechanics. I turn to these questions in Chapters 3 and 4.
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CHAPTER 3
MEDIATIC SPECIFICITY, AFFECTIVE EXPROPRIATIONS, AND THE MAKING-MACHINE OF
BLACK WOMEN: ON THE GIF’S PROMISE OF ONTOLOGICAL (IM)POSSIBILITY
What does it mean to queer the Marxist dialectical relation between the
abstract and the concrete, especially as detailed in Kevin Floyd’s Reification of
Desire?1 While I have identified the queering of this Marxist dialectic as
paramount to my argument’s efficacy, it is necessary to note that I understand
the virtue of this method to exceed its recursive revision of the Marxist categories
of abstract and concrete. To queer the dialectical relation of those two categories
requires reflexivity not merely at the level of executed method; reflexivity is also
demanded with equal force in determinations of method as such.
That is, to work through the queered Marxism Floyd envisions obliges me
to adopt a position of reflexive autocritique directed toward my traversals
between the registers of the conceptual and the particular as well as toward how
I delineate the very coordinates of those traversals. Floyd’s queered Marxism, so
espoused, takes its concern at two levels—that of “method” (the dialectical
movement between abstract and concrete) and that of meta-method (the iterative
reimagining of the character of that dialectical movement which is informed by
the diverse contexts of its employment). That is, to think the concrete is to think it
informed by the abstract, and to think the abstract is to think it informed by the
concrete. An analytical account endeavoring to explain how the racialized

1

See generally Kevin Floyd, The Reification of Desire: Toward a Queer Marxism (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2009).
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reaction GIF extracts its subject’s affective must therefore be foregrounded by
attention to the question of mediatic specificity. To attend to the GIF’s mediatic
specificity is to consider its technical constitution in the contextual historicity of its
deployment.
In their reflections on the materiality of new media, Steven Maras and
David Sutton advocate an approach to theorizing medium specificity “not in terms
of purity or as a norm, but precisely as a product of interaction between different
elements in an assemblage of material processes.”2 These processes are
material in both the technical and historical senses. The methodological impulse
of a medium-specific analysis is a discerning sensitivity to the internally
differentiated field of a medium’s emergence; its attention is carefully directed to
the context of a medium’s production and the sites at which the medium exceeds
the bounds of that enabling context.
In the discussion that follows I offer a provisional account of the GIF
filtered through the optics of its mediatic specificity. I turn to questions about the
GIF’s looping function, representative of its style and form, to further interrogate
how the GIF troubles the temporal fields in which it is circulated. Through this
critical appraisal of the image’s looping sequence I develop an account of the
GIF’s relation to the affective. I then consider the affectivity of the GIF as a
question of labor—that is, as a question of affective labor. This theoretical
exegesis will frame and orient my return in this discussion’s concluding entries to

2

Steven Maras and David Sutton, “Medium Specificity Re-visited,” Convergence: The
International Journal of New Media Technologies 6, no. 2 (2000): 102.
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the racialized reaction GIF and to the relationship between the extraction of
affective labor and the process of making-machine.

Networked Looping and Affective Repetition: Sketching a Provisional
Account of the GIF
Extant literature providing a critical engagement with the relation between
the GIF and the social can be loosely taxonomized as proceeding along one of
two routes. The first cluster is broadly governed by methods reflecting a
particular derivative of cultural studies that tends to emphasize the GIF’s
potential for communicative multiplicity without attendant regard to the image’s
materiality and its concomitant specificity.3 The second cluster, reflective of a
subset of media studies whose impulses include media archaeology, network
theory, and deep focus on technical specificity, privileges the particularity of the
GIF as a digital medium in its examinations. My purpose here will not be to argue
in favor of one method or the other; instead, I illuminate the potentials and
insufficiencies of each, thereby sharpening the methodological form of my own
analysis and its possibilities. Ultimately, the method I pursue cannot be classified
as either cultural studies or media studies. Moving through the overlapping and
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My critique of a certain brand of cultural studies frameworks, which reads with suspicion their
unproblematized embrace of unfettered choice, possibility, and opportunity, resonates with Kane
Race’s powerful diagnosis of the assimilation of some versions of cultural studies into a
marketized, consumer-capitalist logic. In Pleasure Consuming Medicine, Race recalls that
“cultural studies of pleasure and resistance have been criticized for providing too optimistic a
celebration of [popular culture vis-à-vis consumption], in effect reproducing voluntaristic and
populist accounts of liberation that sound all too suspiciously like the individualizing dreams of the
market.” Kane Race, Pleasure Consuming Medicine: The Queer Politics of Drugs (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2009), 74. It is toward this subsidiary, what Race describes as a “cultural
studies of pleasure and resistance,” that my critique is oriented.
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conflicting domains of medium specificity, discursive formations, and theories of
the affective, I propose an account of the GIF emphasizing the relationship of its
looping form to the ossification of particular economies of affect as a way to
address the image’s medium specificity as formed by and formative of its social
and historical context—including those of violent racialization. More specifically,
the form of affect I connect to the loop is that of affective labor.

A “Cultural Studies” Approach to the GIF: Decontextualization and the Question
of Emancipation.
The disarticulation of the GIF from its source, so this genre of cultural
studies argument goes, radically ensures that the image’s content will exceed the
boundaries of its imposed meaning. Through an excision that transcends the
boundedness of its origin, the GIF scrambles whatever semiotic stability had
cohered at the scene of its production, and generated instead is a theatre of
immanently polysemic contextual exchange. The GIF’s capacity to signify
otherwise thus marks what is exemplary about its potential as a technology of
resistance. If, however, the GIF’s potential for resistant signification is tied to its
deployment in situations that “exceed the boundaries” of its origin, then nearly
every instance of the image’s (re)deployment—insofar as each instance of
deployment represents an event, a moment of irreducible difference—would
seemingly activate this subversive capacity. Demarcating the GIF’s origin with
such molecular specificity, as these arguments implicitly do, yields a constitutive
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“outside,” one whose effective infinitude fetishizes any instance of GIF circulation
as always already resisting a normative order.4
In accounts that too readily embrace the GIF as a harbinger of resistance,
the relationship of the GIF’s material specificity to the analysis performed is often
the catalyst of logical inconsistency or obfuscating exuberance. Frequently
detailed in these texts is a hermeneutical method that clearly acknowledges the
GIF as a cultural text whose emergence as such is conditioned by its technical
affordances and structural constraints. Executed, however, is an analysis that
apprehends the GIF as a cultural text whose mediatic specificity is no more than
the raw, apolitical stuff out of which the image emerges.
Stated otherwise, while these texts certainly acknowledge the constitutive
tie between the GIF and its technical structure as well as the merit of remaining
analytically attentive to that tie, their corresponding analyses frequently (and
likely inadvertently) relegate the GIF’s material specificity to an either
depoliticized or pre-social (rather than co-emergent) domain. Their articulated
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For examples of statements broadly representative of an uncomplicated celebration of the GIF’s
resistant possibilities through its capacity to exceed the signifying boundaries of the image’s
origin, see Kate M. Miltner and Tim Highfield, “Never Gonna GIF You Up: Analyzing the Cultural
Significance of the Animated GIF,” Social Media + Society 3, no. 3 (2017): 2 (“[M]alleability and
versatility are key to the GIF’s capacity for interpretive flexibility; the separation of GIFs from their
original texts imbues them with multiple layers of meaning that are not universally accessible to
all audiences . . . [and] provides the GIF with resistant potential: similar to double-entendre,
parody, [and] other types of layered texts, GIFs can be (and often are) used to communicate
hidden meanings in plain sight.”); James Ash, “Sensation, Networks, and the GIF: Toward an
Allotropic Account of Affect,” in Networked Affect, ed. Ken Hillis, Susanna Paasonen, and Michael
Petit (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015), 122 (“GIFs thereby demonstrate how simple forms of
technology can undermine the supposed control that the cultural industries . . . have over the
content they create, for GIFs work only by exceeding the context of their production.”); Graig
Uhlin, “Playing in the Gif(t) Economy,” Games and Culture 9, no. 6 (2014): 526 (“The enduring
potential of the GIF as a format to resist [corporatization] . . . resides in the format’s low-fi
technological base and corresponding aesthetic look . . . [which may work to ensure that it
continues to be a channel for unofficial and user-generated cultural production . . . .”).
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method is ultimately displaced at the site of its execution, with the promised
attention to mediatic specificity languishing into a series of neutralized
identifications. Often masked in these identifications are presuppositions about
the facial self-sufficiency and political self-evidence of claims about the import of
a medium’s materiality.5
Kate M. Miltner and Tim Highfield’s “Never Gonna GIF You Up: Analyzing
the Cultural Significance of the Animated GIF” (“Never Gonna GIF You Up”) is an
instructive example of some features of the approach just described. Much to the
credit of their sophisticated analysis, Miltner and Highfield conduct a nuanced
reading of the GIF as a pluralizing signifier vital to the ecology of digital media.
Nevertheless, their account suffers from internal dislocations caused by the
division between the method proposed and the analysis effected—that is, caused
by their promise to rigorously attend to the GIF’s definitive materiality and their
ultimately unsatisfactory engagement with its medium specificity. Consider the

5

To be clear, my point is not to deny or repudiate the sophisticated contributions to media studies
enabled by cultural studies methods. Nor is my point that subscription to and adoption of certain
cultural studies methods must entail a facile engagement with a medium’s materiality or, more
inconceivably, an express disavowal of the politics of medium materiality. Broad generalizations
of that ilk reproduce a category error whose difference is only one of degree from that generated
by inconsistent attention to questions of medium specificity. Instead, I would like to direct my
attention to what Penelope Deutscher would call the “suspended reserves” of cultural studies
methods. In Foucault’s Futures, Deutscher proposes a hermeneutic of intratextual affirmation, a
mode reading against the constructive grains of generosity and possibility, that provocatively
marshals a text’s suspended reserves, seeing in what may be even “the most unpromising
theoretical resources [the opportunity] to stimulate the emergence of new concepts.” These
reserves are the sites of a text’s latent potential, and to mine them is to realize that “[to] identify
the limits of theory is, indirectly, also to negotiate with the limits of one’s interrogation.” What
emerges from that negotiation is the product of a productive tension between theorists and critics.
Rather than mark theoretical endeavors as always already mired by lack, Deutscher espouses a
mode of textual confrontation that is less concerned with antagonism and more invested in
expanding the limits of any critical epistemology. Penelope Deutscher, Foucault’s Futures: A
Critique of Reproductive Reason (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 5–11.
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following excerpt from the article’s introduction, wherein Miltner and Highfield
identify the conceptual and methodological presuppositions fundamental to their
argument:
In this article, we examine the GIF as cultural text and device. . . . [The]
GIF has certain technical affordances that make it highly versatile . . .
thanks to a combination of [its] features, constraints, and affordances.
GIFs are polysemic, largely because they are isolated snippets of larger
texts. This, combined with their endless, looping repetition, allows them to
relay multiple levels of meaning. . . . In [what] follow[s], we outline and
articulate the GIF’s features and affordances, investigate their
implications, and discuss their broader significance for digital culture and
communication.6
The diagnostic promise of “Never Gonna GIF You Up” is an understanding of the
GIF’s significance to digital culture and evolving communication mores routed
through the distinct materiality of the GIF. In other words, the cultural meaning of
the image format is the primary object of scrutiny, with the image’s technical
attributes, described by Miltner and Highfield as the GIF’s “features and
affordances,” shedding light on that cultural meaning (and thus in service to the
creation of cultural meaning). The “features and affordances” the two mention are
variously held to include the image’s “duration, color, and repetition,” its “lack of
sound or playback options,” and the “versatility” of its file format.7 The enabling
circumscriptions of these “features and affordances” are, per Miltner and
Highfield, critical to the most frequent applications of the GIF: “the performance
of affect; the relationship between polysemy, decontextualization, and repetition;
and the demonstration of cultural knowledge.”8
6

Miltner and Highfield, “Never Gonna GIF You Up,” 4–5 (emphasis added).
Ibid., 4.
8
Ibid.
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Curiously, in their respective discussions of the GIF’s most visible patterns
of application, Miltner and Highfield seldom think through the image’s distinctive
materiality beyond its reduction to semantic content. For example, the two rightly
recognize that the image’s resignifying potential is a contingent byproduct of its
“perpetual embedding and re-embedding” in new conversations. The capacity to
move seamlessly across digital platforms, however, is claimed to “highlight the
content’s malleability,” that is, the malleability of the GIF’s representational
prowess, rather than the malleability afforded by the medium in its singularity.
This critical appraisal of the Milter and Highfield’s diagnostic language may seem
politically inconsequential. Indeed, it may even seem that I am arguing for a more
rigid distinction between “form” and “substance.” That, however, is assuredly not
my purpose. I am instead arguing for a more nuanced attention to the imbricated,
reciprocally generative relationship shared by form and substance. Rather than
subsume one into the other (and thereby efface the productive tensions
engendered by the meeting of form and substance), I wish to suspend form—
here, approximately akin to the GIF’s medium specificity—and substance—here,
approximately akin to the GIF’s representational content—in a taut relation that
resists passage into a dialectical synthesis, making two into one and difference
into sameness. When Miltner and Highfield assert that the meaning the GIF
constructs is “based not just on [its] content . . . but also on the surrounding
factors (captions, messages, and the like), which provide additional context and
layers for interpretation,” the GIF’s materiality, what marks it as a distinctive
digital medium, is diminished to the apolitical circuitry of semantic transmission.
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The reduction of the image’s mediatic specificity to the discursively neutral
means of content signification appears again in the text’s discussion of the loop.
There, Miltner and Highfield remark that the
looping experience of the GIF on social media can last for any number of
iterations (full or partial), and the variable length of the loop allows it to
create new emphasis and meaning . . . . This allows the GIF to feature a
new, self-contained narrative, separate to the longer sequence from which
the loop is sourced: an individual GIF can provide set-up and resolution,
punch line and affect, or indeed play with these dynamics to continually
deny the viewer a denouement.9
In their account of the GIF’s loop, what may be regarded as the characteristic
hallmark of the digital image genre and the consummate particularity of its
technical affordance, the loop is exclusively rendered as a means to create and
communicate narrative. Miltner and Highfield take the force of the GIF’s repetition
as the continuously accreting power of narrative display, where such repetition is
part of the GIF’s meaning-making prowess—“in content as well as form.” That
form has been reduced to content, that the materiality of the GIF is portrayed
raw, pre-discursive stuff onto which representational practices are projected,
marks the fundamental aporia of Miltner and Highfield’s account.
At stake, then, in my review of the methodological bodies through which
interpretations of the GIF have been produced, is how an account of the GIF’s
meaning-making capacity should proceed such that the articulated account
neither denies nor privileges substance or form, neither content nor material
specificity. How, though, to think about the making of meaning? And how should

9

Ibid., 6.

60

the meaning making be understood to congeal around certain representative
practices, such as the racialized reaction GIF, a signifier somehow marked as
innocuous, banal, and outside the violence of racializing discursive formations?
As a provisional matter, I maintain a position that meaning must be understood
as made processually. That is, meaning-making is a process which transpires
within historically situated horizons that establish the limits of that process.
The relative felicity of the meaning-making process, which might be
measured according to the expressive capacity of any sign or signs around which
meaning is made to cohere, is, following Brian Massumi’s approach to the
processual, a consequence of the iterative expression of complementary
tendencies. “The coherence of a process,” Massumi suggests, “is that of
tendency, feeding back on itself in such a way as to generate always another
difference.”10 A tendency never expresses in isolation, however, as “the incursion
of processually formative force always brings more than one tendency into
incipient expression.”11 As a result, “tendencies compete with each other. One
may dominate another. A given tendency may end up monopolizing the
production of difference . . . [and] [m]any tendencies will fail to fully express.”12
What enables meaning to cohere through its processual making, per Massumi’s
exposition, is the intimate proximity of tendency and process he proposes.
Repetition of tendencies may not proceed without the internal differentiation of
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the process of which they are an element, but, even in the wake of this
differentiation, the tendencies constitutive of meaning-making are driven by the
social partitions they generate. Massumi gestures toward this interpretation, I
would contend, in his characterization of a process’ reflexive “feeding back on
itself.” The tendencies generative of a process—the process of meaning-making,
as an example—always fold back into themselves, recuperating the integrity of
the process and releasing the excess of their difference as the latent potentiality
that may unravel the process itself.
Massumi’s understanding of the reflexivity of tendencies to reconstitute
the processes from which they emerge—and to which they are threatening—may
be most clearly stated thus: “What gives consistency to the process is the
tendential direction in which the formations possessed of it move together,
across their tensions. Here, it becomes unity . . . a singular abstraction that
exerts an attractive force.”13 It is, as Massumi eloquently narrates, the tendency
of the social order’s tendencies to asymptotically press toward the continue
coherence of the hegemonic formations out of which they emerge and into which
they feed.
For this reason, the meaning made upon the GIF’s deployment cannot be
facilely regarded as an inevitably assured, formalistically variable expression of
resistance to the normative order. Rather, the potential meanings generated
during the GIF’s circulation are always inflected by the tendential logics that
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suffuse and seep from the social. Economies of racializing subordination, for
example, are both prior to and formative of the very scene of the image’s
exchange. To blithely embrace the GIF as the quintessential technology of
resistance is to disavow the violent social formations organizing the forces
propelling the exchange of certain images in certain contexts. It is to approaches
more rooted in media studies, a discipline that integrates multiple theoretical
traditions through which it investigates objects’ medium specificity in the age of
new media, that I now turn.

A “Media Studies” Approach to the GIF: Medium Specificity, Technical Structure,
and the Turn to Affect.
Among the contributions to the 2015 anthology Networked Affect is James
Ash’s “Sensation, Networks, and the GIF: Toward an Allotropic Account of Affect”
(“Allotropic Account”), a meditation on the GIF thought through the optics of
medium specificity and affect. I offer “Allotropic Account” as illustrative of the
second cluster of approaches mobilized in critical appraisals of the GIF as a
digital media object and a distinctive mode of communication. Such approaches
recognize the analytical merit of considering an object’s medium specificity,
though their forwarding of the mediatic object often obscures the particular
contexts of its use as well as the particular social positions of the object’s
subject-users.
Ash endeavors in “Allotropic Account” to effect a departure from
conventional perceptions of the GIF as “a mindless form of disaffection” by
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foregrounding instead the image’s capacity to “actively amplify the potential for
affect through [its] technical structure.”14 “[T]o understand the type of affect a
media object generates,” Ash explains, “one needs to pay detailed attention to its
material specificity.”15 With regard to the GIF, the image’s efficacious generation
of affect is fundamentally “related to its particular properties and capacities as an
object, as well as to its content, because its particularities as a file type frame
and organize the types of [affects] transmitted within it.”16 The scope of Ash’s
intervention is consciously circumscribed by his attention to the image’s mediatic
materiality, which, in an endnote, Ash recognizes as seemingly detachable from
inquiries into the GIF’s representational content and contextual deployment. Ash
there remarks that “[w]hile the content of a GIF as well as its cultural context are
key components in [its] affective response, the focus of [the] essay is on the
GIF’s technical attributes.”17
The theoretical overture undergirding Ash’s examination of the GIF’s
affective potentialities is his revision of Gilles Deleuze’s notion of allotropy
through the interrelated optics of sensation and affect. Ash sketches the contours
of his theoretical remediation thus:
[S]ensation can be understood as the rhythmic organization of organic and
inorganic forces along with the transmission of these forces. Affects can
be understood as the encounter of those organized forces with other
bodies, an encounter which in turn shapes what these bodies are and the
sensations they can generate. Sensations are constantly being
reorganized through events of affective encounter, which in turn generate
new sensations, and thus new contexts for the occurrence of affective
14
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encounters. . . . I define allotropy as the process through which a force is
modulated and expresses itself as a sensation or an affect, and vice
versa, depending on its encounters with other objects within a digital
network.18
Following Ash’s conceptual fashioning, sensations describe the multiply
differentiating transmissions of forces whose organization and application enable
them to cross into bodily perceptibility. When those forces transit between
organic bodies, rather than between an inorganic digital object and an organic
body or among multiple inorganic digital objects, they frequently collide, and
these collisions are conduits for the production of affect. Deftly suturing together
sensation and affect with the GIF as his needled thread, Ash maintains that
“GIFs organize sensation in order to modulate affects and that these modulations
are shaped by the technical specificity of the file types and networks through
which GIFs travel.”19
Admittedly, it is not entirely clear what Ash intends to conceptually
circumscribe within the domain of affect (references to affect as bodily
impression and to affect as emotional response are both present in the text, but
no clarification is further provided) or how his parsed reading of Deleuze’s
notions of sensation, affect, and allotropy can prove politically generative in
contexts beyond that of his own intervention. Ash’s critical discussion of the GIF’s
distinctive materiality, nevertheless, is richly illuminating, as it thinks the image’s
short temporal duration, limited color palette, and capacity for infinite repetition as
centrally constitutive of the GIF’s affective conduction. Because my argument
18
19
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emphasizes the GIF’s abrupt temporality and looping capacity, I briefly consider
Ash’s reflections on each.
Ash attributes to the GIF’s short duration a crucial significance to its
conduction of sensations then modulated into affects. As I have mentioned, a
GIF’s animation time is generally short, lasting for a few seconds before looping
back to the first frame of its content. The endless repetition of content, he posits,
enables viewers to direct their attention to forces beyond those organizing the
GIF’s truncated narrative display. Thus, contrary to the conclusion drawn by
Miltner and Highfield (and by the “cultural studies” cluster more broadly), Ash
claims that attention to “how the GIF communicates sensation and generates
affect . . . suggests that its power to amuse or excite cannot entirely be reduced
to the arbitrary narrative that [a viewer] may apply to the images themselves.”20
This refusal of narrative submission is, for Ash, an enabling and politically
promising consequence of the GIF’s technical limitations, which require that the
image’s file size remains small. Problematically, however, his diagnostic
appraisal of the GIF’s contracted temporality imputes a presupposed abstracted
universality to the image’s content, such that the GIF’s technical limitations will
inevitably produce an experientially selfsame encounter among viewers. Ash
opines that the technical limitations on the image’s file size “mean that in all GIFs
the action shown is necessarily removed from a broader context that would give
the viewer clues about its original source . . . [explaining why] one of the first
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questions often asked about a successful or popular GIF is, ‘Where did it come
from?’”21 Setting aside whether inquiries about origins are actually among the
“first questions” asked about a widely circulated GIF (Ash offers no justification or
citation in support of his observation), Lauren Michele Jackson’s incisive
repudiation of racialized reaction GIFs and digital blackface, discussed in her
“We Need to Talk about Digital Blackface in Reaction GIFs” (“Digital Blackface”),
is premised on the existence of a mutually intelligible racially subordinating
politics of recognition.22 In the scenes Jackson critiques, it is altogether unlikely
that the exchange of a hyperbolically racializing GIF is followed by an inquiry into
its textual origin, as that question is always already answered by that racializing
politics of recognition. The origin of the GIF, the transformation of a scene into a
compressed file that maniacally repeats each and every second that it is visible,
as well as the very impulse to excise that series of frames from its originating
source, is an immanently operative racism, a mobile configuration of dominating
relations that secures the intelligibility of the GIF’s racialized caricature even if its
“originating” text is unknown.
Ash’s “Allotropic Affect” is beset by a similar analytic deficiency in its
discussion of the GIF’s capacity to automatically loop its content. Opining that the
image’s looping nature “leaves [its] ‘before’ and ‘after’ . . . tantalizingly beyond . .
. reach,” Ash derivatively reasons that unless viewers are able to “find the source
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material from which the GIF was drawn, [they] can only guess at what goes on in
the full clip.”23 The immanence of the curiosity felt by those who encounter a GIF
but cannot identify its origin appears as inherent for Ash as the GIF’s irreducibility
to narrativization. Moreover, this internally latent curiosity is inevitably “amplified
by the contextual clues that may be partially visible at the beginning or end of a
loop. . . . [But, with] no simply way of stopping [it], one can only concentrate and
try to catch sight of a recognizable object.”24 The incomprehensibility Ash
postulates as the overwhelming nature of the encounter between GIF and
viewer, haphazardly extensive in its reach, yields the observation that “one
cannot be sure of the particular emotional response that might arise in any single
viewer’s body when watching an animated GIF before [that response] actually
takes place.”25
From the presumed incomprehensibility of the GIF’s content to that
content’s constant production as an object fully demarcated from the viewing
subject, an undeniable motif of objectification runs through Ash’s meditation on
the GIF’s capacity for repetition. Indeed, Ash seemingly locates the hypnotic
allure of the loop in a dialectic of Hegelian recognition, the pleasure of which is
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derived from the foreclosure of synthetic resolution. The viewing subject can only
“try to catch sight of a recognizable object,” a process already embedded within a
horizon saturated by a potential for failure.26 Even if the GIF’s content is of the
humanly embodied other, that the image is circulated for subjects to view
indelibly marks its content as object. After all, what necessarily precludes the
viewer from accurately guessing—or properly recognizing—the “before” and
“after” of the spliced GIF? Do GIFs containing footage of police brutality against
Black persons not follow a disturbingly murderous script, one whose “before” and
“after” could be succinctly narrated by any individual who has been made
intimately conscious of state violence? For those already acquainted with the
repetitive cycle of state brutality, inadvertent exposure to a GIF of racist violence
may not incite the pleasure of narrative determination. Curiosity is not the affect
amplified by a “‘before’ and ‘after’ . . . tantalizingly beyond” reach in this
instance.27 Amplified instead is the hollowed horror that follows from the
mundane saturation of the social worlds the subject occupies with endless
promises of necropolitical adjudication.
Although the insights born of Ash’s commitment to medium-specific
analysis are undoubtedly valuable, they suffer from severely inadequate attention
to the specificity of the social. To cultivate an analysis of the GIF resistant to the
proposition that the image encourages “a mindless form of disaffection” cannot
proceed in the absence of the social contexts in which the GIF purportedly
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evacuates the subject of its critical faculties. Accordingly, insofar as the exclusive
focus of Ash’s intervention was on the GIF’s technical particularities—that is, not
on “the content of [the] GIF as well as its cultural context”—it remains mired in
the register of the abstract, unable to attend to the political urgencies of localized
subjects and their worlds.28
Necessary, then, is an approach to critically appraising the GIF’s role in
the (re)production of the digital-social that transits between the registers of the
conceptual and the concrete. Such an approach must recognize that the GIF’s
distinct materiality should be thought alongside the particularity of its
representational content across different contexts; its movements must go
between registers of abstraction and specificity without presuming or requiring
their synthesis. I attempt below to formulate a provisional account of the GIF
informed by the methodological precepts I have just described. In turning to the
GIF’s hallmark novelty, its infinite looping, I sketch a more robust account of the
affective that develops through its constitutive tie to the repeating GIF and to the
economies of racial subordination the GIF often implicates. Said otherwise, my
analysis will emphasize the image format’s characteristic looping as the vantage
from which a critical analysis of the GIF can felicitously move between the
registers of media and cultural studies without succumbing to the deficiencies of
either.
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Looping into the Perpetual Present: The Process of Making-Machine as the GIF’s
Temporal Order.
What accounts for the uncanny spectacularity of the looping GIF? My very
formulation of the question immediately registers an implacable knot
approximated by this corresponding inquiry: Does the attribution of spectacularity
to the GIF’s uncanny mode of repetition obscure the perverse banality with which
the image is regarded? Or, might it be prudent to arrest the impulse to
categorization altogether, thereby enabling the GIF’s potentiality as both
spectacle and banality? If I appear to sidestep an interrogation of the
experienced character of the GIF’s loop, it is only because what constitutes that
experience is contingency, a constellation of virtuals whose actualization is
determined by the multiple, antagonistic, and irreducibly dissimilar forces that
pressurize the social. That is, whether the GIF is a site of spectacularity, banality,
or an internally differentiating admixture of the two is governed by the contextual
process of meaning-making. In much of the contemporary United States context,
the conditions of late capitalism have aggressively hybridized the spectacular
and the banal, simulating a lust for an endlessly progressive future whose
habituation nevertheless remains frustratingly elusive.
The loop of the GIF, I would argue, capitulates to a similar logic. The GIF
appears to submit itself to that compulsory temporality of linear progression only
to dislodge itself from that compulsive linearity through the loop. The loop is the
cut which paradoxically returns the GIF to its inaugurating moment at the juncture
of a future present. This return to the origin should not, however, suggest that the
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loop is merely an illusion of movement. The image’s recursive spiraling within the
relentless injunctions of progressive capitalistic futurity signals the recuperation
of a certain tendential logic within the process of meaning-making. The GIF’s
capacity for temporal artifice is fundamental to its dispersion as an object
differentially and simultaneously situated as spectacular and banal. Such is the
condition of possibility for digital minstrelsy through the racialized reaction GIF—
the “momentary” adoption of looping scenes of racist caricature as a technique of
extensive self-constitution, one that does not demand acknowledging the grossly
violent moral failures on which the technique’s felicity depends.
What I am proposing about the loop’s meaning-making work is that its
transformations of the social are indissociably connected to its reconfigurations of
the temporal. By virtue of its mediatic particularity, the GIF’s animation is
programmed to move “forward” only to move “back.” Its endless return to the
origin contrasts sharply with the subject-viewer’s inability to return to that prior
temporal juncture, that moment when the GIF was first encountered and began
its continuous play. This heterochronic temporality occupied by the GIF and the
subject viewer functions, per film theorist David Bering-Porter, as a “process of
structuring the ‘now’ to maintain this ‘now’ in perpetuity, and thus to mitigate the
shifting conditions that open up the possibility of risk in the future.”29 In his
examination of the work of experimental filmmaker Martin Arnold, Bering-Porter
discerns “something important, symptomatic, and unique about the temporality of
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our time” in Arnold’s hallmark techniques of exaggerated closeup, time
compression, and scene repetition.30 Arnold’s found-footage films recursively fold
into a choreography of intensive looping, a structural form of the movementimage “now ubiquitous in contemporary digital culture” and paradigmatically
exemplified by the GIF.31 The GIF’s repetition ostensibly collapses “the past and
the future into a perpetual, chronic present,” and this reiterative collapse, “a
strategy for eschewing change altogether in favor of maintaining the conditions of
the status quo,” encodes a promissory pleasure through its transitory flouting of
capital’s imminent self-destruction.32
The two methodological clusters visible in GIF studies I earlier described,
one informed by cultural studies and one by media studies, maintain divergent
positions on the relationship between the GIF and narrative. The cultural studies
approach holds that the GIF’s circumscribed form transformed it into a selfcontained narrative, one that its viewers would attempt to understand by situating
it within the linear teleological progression of narrative form. The media studies
approach, in contradistinction, eschews the GIF’s reduction to an arbitrary
narrative imposed by its viewers, arguing instead that the image’s nonnarratological elements, its incorporeal forces organizing sensation and affect,
are the content from which meaning is derived. Although these two hermeneutics
yield visibly disparate conclusions, there exists an epistemological motif that is
threaded between them and which indicates, albeit implicitly, the substance of
30
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their shared frame: both methods situate their determinations of the GIF’s
capacity to be teleologically narrativized in the near equivalent of a contextual
vacuum. That is to say, both approaches emphasize the subject-viewer’s
experience with the GIF as a singularity, one that is influenced by the
particularities of a social context but not subject to the tendential logics of that
context. It is for this reason that Ash can assert in “Allotropic Affect” that “one
cannot be sure of the particular emotional response that might arise in any single
viewer’s body when watching an animated GIF” and then immediately
acknowledge that the “fact that popular GIFs proliferate . . . suggests that while
they affects they generate are not assured, the organization of sensation can and
does produce equivalent affects in multiple viewers.”33 Ash’s recognition that
organized sensations can produce equivalent affects in different viewers does
not smooth over that claim’s incongruence with his prior statement, namely that
there can be no certainty as to the affective response a GIF incites. What
enables these claims to coexist as mutually intelligible and reinforcing is the
misleading presupposition that the relationship between narrative and GIF is
restricted to the subject-viewer’s experience of comprehending the GIF’s content.
My argument here is twofold. First, I am suggesting that the consequence
of the GIF’s looping capacity should be understood neither as resisting
narrativization nor as succumbing to narrativization. To pursue either alternative
is to restrict the relationship of narrative to the GIF to the isolated content the GIF
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displays, which fundamentally obscures the broader social processes, or “social
narratives,” implicated by the GIF’s content. These broader social processes
cohere through the convergence of certain tendential logics of meaning-making,
logics that exceed the context of any singular GIF but saturate its potential for
meaning and the possible sites of its deployment. Second, I am proposing that
the interrogative scope of an analysis of the GIF’s receptivity to narrativization
vis-à-vis the former’s looping capacity be expanded and multiplied. Such an
examination of the content a GIF communicates must be positioned in a mutual
dialogue with the social and the specific.
Accordingly, when Anna McCarthy contends in her “Visual Pleasure and
GIFs” that, “as loops, GIFs always start in medias res,” her discussion of that
“certain desire to understand what’s going on [which] keeps us looking . . . to
comprehend [a GIF’s] subject matter” principally misconstrues the nature of that
desire.34 McCarthy envisions the desire to comprehend the GIF as a desire to
make sense of the image’s “narrative” in ostensible isolation from the broader
social narratives, or social processes, that delimit the horizons of the meaningmaking process. I am not suggesting that the GIF’s contents be read to efface
their specificity; nor am I suggesting that the GIF’s specificity be aggressively
foregrounded in its capacity to make meaning. Instead, I am suggesting that the
subject-viewer who endeavors to “make sense” of an encountered GIF does so
in a manner that transcends the image’s explicit narratological contents. Just as
34
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the GIF’s loop positions its cycling in medias res, the subject-viewer’s encounter
with the GIF transpires at the level of a macrologically in medias res—it occurs in
the midst of deeply influential and orienting social formations, including, in the
context of American sociality, economies of subordinating racialization.
I would like to dwell a bit longer on the trope of “desire” McCarthy
associates with making meaning of a GIF’s contents, a process primarily enabled
by the image’s endless cycling of its content. McCarthy suggests that the
hypnotic pleasure the subject-viewer derives from transforming a GIF’s contents
into an intelligible communiqué is a consequence of the GIF capturing “that
moment . . . when a difficult task is made easy, and not just made to look easy.”35
Soliciting the pleasure McCarthy diagnoses is the endlessly repeating, elegant
execution of the laboring act, the bodily gesture, the sensual pose, each
suggesting to the subject-viewer that self-perfection is attainable and amenable
to reproduction. The relationship between pleasure and comprehension is clear
and decidedly co-emergent as the subject-viewer examines the GIF, but the
nature of the catalyst innervating the subject-viewer to make sense of the GIF’s
content—that “certain desire”—remains nebulous.
Quoted earlier in part, McCarthy’s full address of this innervating desire to
comprehend is as follows: “GIFs exude . . . to-be-looked-at-ness. In part this is
35
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because, as loops, GIFs always start in medias res, so a certain desire to
understand what’s going on keeps us looking.”36 My purpose in reintroducing this
excerpt is not to fault McCarthy for leaving a determination of the nature of this
desire open. Desire eludes precise definition, and to develop a full account of its
nature is beyond both the scope of McCarthy’s intervention and the scope of my
own. Despite this, desire functions as a clear conceptual signifier for the forcerelation McCarthy intends to describe, and the relationship between desire,
pleasure, and comprehension McCarthy develops vis-à-vis the GIF proffers an
illuminating counterpoint to the argument I have been developing. McCarthy
remarks toward her argument’s conclusion that it is “worth stopping for a moment
and asking what, exactly, makes these [GIFs featuring scenes of automation and
perfected labor] satisfying.”37 Responding to her meditative inquiry, McCarthy
advances an understanding of such GIFs’ pleasuring capacities as having
“something to do with the spectacle of immediate mastery.”38 In this sense, the
pleasure afforded by GIFs is “in line with all capitalist visual culture: it makes a
story from the contradictions inherent in the system.”39
How might McCarthy’s yoking of visual pleasure to the GIF’s spectacular
display of mastery be reread through the alternative conceptual account of the
GIF and its looping characteristic I have proposed? What would be made of the
relationship between mastery, spectacle, the GIF, the durative present, and
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hegemonic social narratives? The GIF’s capacity for meaning-making is, I have
suggested, intimately bound to its reconfiguration of contemporary temporalities.
That is, the GIF offers a comforting illusion of the present in durative perpetuity,
an illusion that actively contests the turbulence of American sociality and its
concomitant violences. This promise of the present’s endless return, perhaps
even of a return to a prior present, one not yet adulterated by the dynamic
vicissitudes of the social, is iteratively recuperated and reinstantiated by the
GIF’s repetition.
If the pleasure generated by exposure to the GIF’s repetition can be more
broadly understood as the pleasure of making meaning at the level of ordering
social narratives, it stands to reason that the “desire” to understand what the GIF
can communicate is also a desire to ensure the calcification of what it has been
enabled to predominantly communicate—those tendential logics constitutive of a
romanticized, nostalgic sociality structured around racialized hierarchy. Thought
in terms of the racialized reaction GIF, the pleasure transited by digital blackface
is the pleasure of an instance of mutual identification. This is the pleasurable
identification shared by the sender and the recipient of the hyperbolically racist
reaction GIF: their mutual identification of a promise, however ephemeral, of the
return of an American social order no longer “disturbed” by the “crisis” of antiracist efforts, a social order in which the momentary adoption of Black
personhood does not challenge but in fact vigorously reinforces systems of racial
subordination and racialized violence. This is the promise of the racialized
reaction GIF. Moreover, it is through these GIFs’ circulation that this promise
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remains disturbingly plausible, as their exchange fortifies the violent process of
the making-machine of Black subjects.
The process of making-machine, instituted by the GIF’s continuous replay
of scenes of racist caricature and hyperbolic violence, is the ascription of
machinic automation to Black bodies. When images of Black persons are
transformed into GIF content, their bodies are forcibly conscripted to the cycle of
infinite representational repeat; the originating site of the GIF’s content becomes
less vital to the meaning-making process than the congruence of that content
with racially subordinating social narratives. Digital minstrelsy does not therefore
depend exclusively on the desire to narrativize the scenes displayed. Instead, its
condition of felicity is its resonance with prior tendential logics undergirding
economies of violent racialization and its fortification of those logics through the
deployment of similar GIFs in similar contexts. That so much of the literature
assessing the GIF as a digital and social object thinks it alongside the figure of
the automaton should engender on surprise, even when the interconnected
histories of the machine, the minstrel, and the mammy have been amply
chronicled. Conceptually accounts of the GIF unproblematically invoke the figure
of the automaton because their analyses proceed at the level of abstraction. The
GIF to which these accounts refer is one whose content is so totalized as to not
be content at all, and the spectating subject they envision at the scene of
encounter with the image is a monolithic universal, an undoubtedly empty
signifier.
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The constitutive interrelation of the looping GIF and the process of
making-machine, it should be noted, extends its overriding influence beyond the
instance of interpersonal digital communication. At a site of dispersed digital
communication, an example of which would be a social media platform, GIFs are
programmed to display their content in a considerably different manner than most
other animated image formats. On platforms like Twitter and Facebook, similar in
this instance to the codified programs of cellphone text-message applications,
the default setting for GIFs that appear on a user’s timeline is to auto-play, and it
is frequently unclear how users can change this setting when not on a mobile
device. When this predetermined preference for movement-image auto-play
intersects with recordings of police brutality disseminated on social media
platforms, the transformation of that footage into GIFs—the usual intent of which
is to incite public response to these unjustified killings—inadvertently creates a
grotesque pageant of endlessly looping, homicidally racist theatre in which social
media users are differentially subjected to the process of making-machine.
The diffusion of police-brutality GIFs has the paradoxical effect of
articulating a demand for social redress as it ossifies the machinic representation
of unjustly murdered Black men and women. Said otherwise, the social
conditions these disseminated GIFs address—the precarity forced upon Black
lives by a state that justifies its violence through implicit recourse to the notion
that Blackness is incongruent with the ontological recognition of an individual’s
personhood—are partially fortified by the Black persons’ endless exposure to
their content. GIFs of police brutality serve as a horrifying reminder of the
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traumas of racist violence through which Black subjects have been inaugurated
into the social. Monica Torres, a New York-based journalist, recalled her first
experience of unexpected exposure to police brutality footage on Twitter in the
wake of the fatal police shooting of seventeen-year-old Lacquan McDonald:
The default for [GIFs] on Twitter is to autoplay, and many users do not opt
out. I was among them. There was no warning that I was about to see
something graphic and disturbing, as there was on the cable networks that
were also showing the video. The [GIF] of McDonald’s death was instead
indiscriminately injected in between my banal tweets about Thanksgiving
prep. Unmoored from even minimal context, the [GIF] felt cheap and
tawdry, with each loop replay increasing some engagement metric, while
righteously confronting nothing.40
Torres here identifies what McCarthy calls the “fugitive temporality” in
which the GIF emerges. McCarthy argues that GIF’s temporal habitat (or, more
accurately, habitats) is resolutely paradoxical: “On the one hand, we encounter
them [i.e., GIFs,] in the miniaturized durationality of the looped fragment. On the
other, we encounter them unexpectedly, in the indeterminate durée that is the
flow of social media.”41 The GIF agonizingly highlights the simultaneous
uncertainty and perpetuity of present. Fashioned to operate in a continuous state
of renewal through repetition, the GIF is certain to reset and restage the
performance of its content—unless, of course it is displaced from the interface on
which it materialized. In addition, one cannot help but pause at the lexical
formation of “fugitive temporality.” As a linguistic marker, “fugitive” saw its
greatest use in the periods immediately preceding, during, and after the Civil
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War, when the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 marked one of the many grotesque
heights of American racism and the dehumanizing violence of the plantation
economy. That the racialized reaction GIF may exist in a “fugitive” temporality, a
time out of joint with the proper, implies the necessity of its domestication. This
domestication is the violence directed toward those Black bodies conscripted to
the GIF’s infinite loop; the traces of this violence are the machinic transfiguration
of Black bodies, that process of making-machine whose dehumanizing
imperative follows in the violent silhouette of the “fugitive slave.”42
Whether by consciously scrolling through the history of a text-message
exchange or by accidentally reloading the newsfeed on a social media platform,
the spectating subject always brooks the possibility that some action will remove
the GIF from its visual field. There is no promise that a GIF encountered once will
be encountered again when, for example, a newsfeed is reloaded. Then again,
there is no assurance that the repeated scene of McDonald’s murder will not
unexpectedly resurface when reviewing conversations with intimate relations, a
horror shared with the hope of reducing the trauma that its reappearance again
incites. And, when a GIF does resurface, its equivalent appearance may be
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misleading; the structural signature of the file format, after all, “is the malleability
of its contents, [its] easy transmigration from one platform to another, or from one
user to another.”43
This language of malleability and seamless transmigration echoes Michel
Foucault’s novel theorization of power relations in the first volume of The History
of Sexuality. There, Foucault avers that power must be understood “as the
process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms,
strengthens, or reverses; as the support which these force relations find in one
another, thus forming a chain or a system . . . [as] exercised from innumerable
points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations.”44 That relations of
power have no inherent, first-order form and no governing metaphysical
substance marks them as contextually adaptive and always conductive; they
crystallize in figurations as explicit as the state apparatus and as seemingly
ephemeral as the GIF. Indeed, that the GIF can travel so swiftly, can move
between digital ecologies with such ease, marks it as a relay point of
Foucauldian power, one that transforms as necessary and works not through its
spectacular singularity but through its insidious banality.45
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The Affect of the GIF: Notes on the Affective Labor of Looping.
Toward a Provisional Account of Affect. I have thus far claimed that the
racialized reaction GIF draws its meaning through the implication of diffuse social
narratives, particularly those subtended by economies of racial subordination. I
have suggested that, through its looping animation, the GIF mobilizes the
intuitive availability of these social orders’ tendential logics, an argument I framed
through an alternative reading of the GIF’s relationship with temporality and
narrativization. What my account has not provided, however, is an examination of
how the circulation of racialized reaction GIFs works on, through, and alongside
the embodied subjects facilitating that exchange, as well as how those subjects
engage the meaning-making process through GIF circulation. Without an
understanding of how bodies and GIFs mutually interrogate and generate each
other’s intelligibility, my argument will prove unable to adequately address the
material specificity of the encounter between GIFs and their subject-viewers. To
address this lacuna, I turn to the affective, augmenting my discussion’s scope by
forwarding how GIFs and bodies interface through the manufacture,
transmission, and diminishment of affective resonances.
It is useful to begin by returning to Monica Torres’ powerful meditation on
the traumatic imbrication of the GIF and the scene of police brutality. Recounting
her jarringly visceral reaction to realizing that Laquan McDonald’s murder had
been spliced and transformed into a GIF, Torres writes:
In its [GIF] form, the disturbing video of [McDonald’s] death had
become a puppet show, and McDonald a marionette, made to rise and
fall, ridden with bullets 16 times, then 32, then 48, and on and on. Unlike a
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video clip, which is buffered by a lead-up and at least has an end point, a
[GIF] isolates the most traumatic moments and continues replaying them
indefinitely, without warning and without your permission.
To be marked in this way in American culture—to be looped in a [GIF],
to be put on display as “animated” at the behest of audiences—is [to] be
racialized, othered . . . . For [B]lack bodies, being “animated”—a condition
that [GIFs], by nature of their form, automatically impose—already marks
you as other. . . . On an infinite loop in [GIFs], this hyperanimation
reenacts the spectacle [of racialization] for our consumption, puppets
made to rise and fall. . . . In looping, the larger context is cropped out and
we are left with only the most inflammatory, most affecting moment.46
I have excerpted a significant portion of Torres’ commentary because she is
relentlessly acute in her recognition that the GIF generates the specificity of its
meaning by drawing upon the lingering intensities and inevitable excesses that
accumulate between, beside, and across the temporal registers it implicates.
With each loop, Torres provocatively claims, “the heartbeat [of the GIF] gets
louder and we get closer to believing the [GIF] is alive.”47 How, then, to think the
pulse of the GIF, its im-pulse, that is, how its animating pulse leaves an
impression on the bodies that encounter it, leading to their own sensed
impulsions? Embedded within the idea that the GIF leaves an impression on the
bodies it encounters is an intimation of excess or surplus. That the GIF leaves a
bodily trace in its wake suggests that the force-relations constitutive of that
encounter could not be fully recuperated by the social. I do not mean to suggest,
to be clear, that in its exceeding recuperation this remainder becomes an
autonomous substance acting “outside” the social. I would maintain quite the
opposite: this remainder institutes the GIF’s production of affect, the circulation of
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which partially shapes Black subjectivity according to the logic of makingmachine.
I am interesting in thinking together the GIF and affect through a
conductive hermeneutic attendant to relations of intensity that produce a quality
of excess, of surplus, of something “more than” what an encounter was otherwise
expected to generate. Intensities are akin to forces, to force-relations, where
“force” is not synonymous with forcible but gestures toward “an impingement or
extrusion of a momentary or sometimes more sustained state of relation as well
as the passage (and the duration of passage) of . . . intensities.”48 In a dynamic,
unfolding field of vectors, flights, and vibrations, affect reveals itself “as a gradient
of bodily capacity—a supple incrementalism of ever-modulating force-relations—
that rises and falls not only along various rhythms and modalities of encounter
but also through the troughs and sieves of sensibility.”49 Gregory J. Seigworth
and Melissa Gregg emphasize one of the fundamental insights of theorizing
bodily-becoming through affect as follows: “[T]he capacity of a body is never
defined by a body alone but is always aided and abetted by, and dovetails with,
the field or context of its force-relations.”50
Because the brokerage of affect always implicates the body’s contextual,
circulatory capacities, turning to affect as a theoretical interlocutor chances a
more radical exhumation of “how bodies or objects may produce or experience
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intensity as they pass from one state to another . . . [within] complex networks of
people and machines and assemblages of interaction and cohabitation.”51
Implied by this statement, which opens the first chapter of the 2015 anthology
Networked Affect, is the possibility of seeing what was otherwise rendered
unseeable through attention to the affective. That is, what may be realized by the
careful tracing of affective circulations is an account of the transitions of bodies
and objects—of bodies into objects, of objects into bodies, where “object”
references a constructed category that is the result of an objectifying process.
Precipitated by the shuttling of affective intensities as well as generative of those
intensities, these changes track are emblematic of the torqueing of Black
subjectivity effected by the process of making-machine. The intimate connection
of the GIF as techno-affective site and the contingency of the subject is
highlighted by Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska, who astutely state, “It is not
simply the case that ‘we’—that is, autonomously existing humans—live in a
complex technological environment that we can manage, control, and use.
Rather, we are—physically and hence ontologically—part of that technological
environment, and it makes no more sense to talk of us using it, than it does of it
using us.”52
Accordingly, to think the affective is to think the contingency of relationality
and becoming. The idea of affect, which is not reducible to emotion, to feeling, or
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to physical impingement, involves an investigation of the transitional as well as of
the circuitry through which transitions are channeled. I do not propose a notion of
affect that can operate as a preexisting, self-contained heuristic. Nor is affect a
sieve through which an object of scrutiny may be filtered in order to reach some
theoretically consonant end. To think through the affective is to propose a
methodological posture that is sensitive to the ephemera of experience, the
transmission of sensations that elude conscious perception, and the accretion of
forces that fortify the tendential logics of the social. Ultimately, then, to
conceptualize with and through affect is to open one’s analysis to an emergent
critical mode, as the constitutive resonances of the affective materialize in
tandem with the object under investigation.
Affect and Its Labor. The relationship between the GIF, affect, and the
process of making-machine is one of extraction. To be forcibly conscripted into
the GIF’s infinite looping is to perform simultaneously the heights of affected
animacy and the troughs of machinic automaticity. The racialized logics that
govern the selection of reaction GIFs seek out those representations of Black
subjects that embody hyperbole and codify that excessive “more than”
characteristic of affective intensities. When the racialized reaction GIF is
circulated in an interpersonal exchange, the setting to which Jackson devotes the
latter half of her argument in “Digital Blackface,” its purpose is to performatively
generate that remainder which exceeds the social’s recuperative efforts, that is,
an affective intensity. The nature of this intensity is drawn by the “more than” of
the GIF’s racist caricature. The momentary adoption of the hyperbolic Black
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persona represented in the racialized reaction GIF is the momentary charging of
the body through the historical circuitry of minstrelsy and its racially subordinating
effects. In the impression it leaves on the body, the affective dimension of digital
minstrelsy experientially materializes the possible promise of a return to that
romantic past of brutally enforced racial hierarchy (a nostalgic (re)turn that
solidifies the intensification of a sadistically anti-Black unfolding present).
But, what enables the conduction of this charge? What ensures that this
remainder which marks the body etches into it a commitment to economies of
racialized violence and their constitutive, tendential logics? It is in response to
these questions that I offer a formulation of the process of making-machine
through the optic of affective labor. Making-machine involves not just the
perversion of a politics of recognition that refuses the commensurability of Black
subjectivity and the ontological category of personhood. Making-machine also
speaks to the extraction of Black subjects’ affective labor when they are
transformed into GIF content. The conscription of Black bodies into the automatic
repetition of the GIF is technology of discipline that extracts their affective labor
to subtend the violent economies implicated by the circulation of racialized
reaction GIFs. It is this extraction of affective labor that capacitates the charged
possibility of digital minstrelsy and the adoption of Blackness through its
subjection. Making-machine therefore involves two coeval processes: a politics of
recognition that transforms the Black subject into a machinic entity as well as an
extraction of that subject’s affective labor to undergird the dialectic of recognition
described above.
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Arguably the most influential conception of affective labor is that of
Michael Hardt, which maintains that the rise of labor’s affective valence has been
contemporaneous with the ascendance of capitalist service economies. What
typifies current capitalist paradigms, Hardt contends, is the centripetally
integrating forces of knowledge production, information systems, and
communication modalities. Service provision has its seat at the core of Western
late capitalist models, with labor associated with the industrial archetype of the
factory outsourced to “developing” nations. Unsurprisingly, the dominance of
service-driven economies in Western nations has resulted in the conspicuous
absence of manufactured material goods, once regarded as the capitalistic
products par excellence, originating from those economies. Because the
provision of services through market exchange generates no material, durable
commodity form, Hardt continues, “we might define the labor involved in this
production as immaterial labor—that is, labor that produces an immaterial good,
such as a service, knowledge, or communication.”53
The production of services involves various modes of immaterial labor, the
synthetic motif of which is the intangible character of the commodities such labor
produces. Hardt goes on to propose a tripartite taxonomy of immaterial labor: its
first form involves the informationalization of industrial production; its second
form involves the manipulation of creative drives toward the development of
symbolic representations; and its third form involves “the affective labor of human
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contact and interaction.”54 Anticipating an objection to the idea of immaterial
labor’s affective face, Hardt expressly notes that this labor is indeed immaterial,
“even if it is corporeal and affective, in the sense that its products are intangible:
a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, passion—even a sense of
connectedness or community.”55 Essential to this third derivative of immaterial
labor, Hardt explains, is its “creation and manipulation of affects. Such affective
production, exchange, and communication is generally associated with human
contact, with the actual presence of another, but that contact can be either actual
or virtual.”56 In the final portion of his text, Hardt switches registers to devote
further attention to his notion of affective labor, the potential of which is marked
as coextensive with the field of Foucauldian biopower, “the power of the creation
of life . . . [and] the production of collective subjectivities, sociality, and society
itself.”57 The biopolitical production of conditions fostering life and enabling death
at the localized level is routed through the circuitry of affective labor, and for this
reason Hardt deems affective labor to be ontologically generative.
Hardt’s narrative of the amplification of affective labor in contemporary
capitalist production is not without its tensions. Perhaps most glaring is his
argument’s risky entanglement with the production of monolithic conceptual
frames, rendering a notion like “affective labor” concurrently too comprehensive
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and too abstracted. While this is likely the consequence of the text’s reliance on a
historical teleology that weds technological advancement and social progression,
I nonetheless find Hardt’s commentary to be importantly instructive to my own
analysis. Hardt’s identification of the virtual as a generative site of affective labor
is especially germane to this discussion, as is his provocation that affective labor
produces subjectivity, society, and life.
Expanding on Hardt’s reflections, I would suggest that the virtual
possibilities of affective labor, particularly when it is socially commodified and
capacitated to exceed the rigid boundaries of capitalist enterprise, are central to
the meaning-making “work” of the racialized reaction GIF. Hardt underscores that
virtually habituated services are as conductive of affective sensations as service
labor performed in the “actual” presence of the consumer. Implicit in this
statement, I contend, is the potential to shift focus from the recipient of affective
labor’s production to that labor’s producer. That is to say, insofar as an individual
need not be present in the “actual” to produce commodifiable affects, an
individual’s virtual presence can generate affects even when that virtuality is
conjured in the form of a simulacrum.
Affective labor, as Hardt acknowledges, is no less subject to the
exploitative logics of capital than labor producing a material, durable commodity.
The racialized reaction GIF is able to successfully operate through the charged
circuitry of affective circulation because it continuously produces and extracts the
affective labor of the subject forcibly conscripted into its endless recursivity. The
GIF’s loop, then, should be understood to do more than merely reset the scene
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for another cycle; the loop is the linchpin of this iterative cycle of affective
production and violent expropriation. With every cycle of its content, the
racialized reaction GIF primes the virtual mechanisms of affective production. As
that intensity moves among the image’s recipients, the extraction of the displayed
Black subject’s affective labor fortifies the tendential logics of subordinating
racialization as this intensive force-relation traverses from the register of the
interpersonal to the macrologically social. Through this traversal, the Black body
is manufactured as a machinic entity, something less than human and therefore
unrecognizable within the ontological category of personhood. At the same time,
the Black subject transformed into GIF content is made to stand in for all Black
subjects, hyperbolically animated for deployment in the caricaturing racism of
digital blackface. The extraction of the Black subject’s affective labor further
undergirds this perverse dialectic of recognition, enjoining Black subjectivities to
diametrically represent the most extreme displays of (in)human animacy and, in
reciprocal necessity, the very impossibility of Black humanity. This is the process
of making-machine. It is to this process in the context of the Leakes GIF that I
turn in the concluding chapter to expand upon the making-machine hermeneutic
and to consider its concrete interventions on Black subjectivities.
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CHAPTER 4
THE AFFECTIVE MAMMIFICATION AND LOOPING MINSTRELIZATION OF REACTION GIFS:
A QUESTION OF BLACK HUMANITY IN THE DIGITAL OBJECT
In A Thousand Plateaus, the second volume of their Capitalism and
Schizophrenia, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari develop the idea of the refrain
as a conceptual apparatus through which to further augment their theories of
social becoming. Deleuze and Guattari understand the refrain as a “prism, a
crystal of space-time . . . [acting] upon that which surrounds it, sound or light,
extracting from it various vibrations, or decompositions, projections, or
transformations.”1 Its function is catalytic, “not only to increase the speed of the
exchanges and reactions in that which surrounds it, but also to assure indirect
interactions between elements devoid of so-called natural affinity, and thereby to
form organized masses.”2 It is in the refrain’s nature to become “concentrated by
elimination in a very short moment, as though moving from the extremes to a
center, or, on the contrary, to develop by additions, from a center to the
extremes.”3 The refrain spreads outward from the putatively singular
spatiotemporal site of its invocation, in a gesture that exceeds the limits of formal
space (i.e., what is presumed to be constrained by interpersonal communication)
and linear, progressive time (i.e., what is presumed to be the relationship
between past, present, and future). It is not time, then, that governs the refrain;
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“rather, the refrain is the a priori form of time, which in each case fabricates
different times.”4
The endless cyclicality of the GIF, the quintessential feature of the file
format and a principal explanation for the format’s return to popularity, inscribes
the GIF as one potentiality within Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the refrain.5
For them, the refrain represents a form of repetition that facilitates the feeding
back of affective channels onto themselves, enabling their multiplication and
rhizomatic dispersion and thereby remaining resistant to the dominance of any
exclusively linguistic model of semiotic meaning. To be attentive to the refrain is
not to propose (although it is also not to unilaterally proscribe) that the lacunae in
signifying systems are “empty” only insofar as they have not been filled by
linguistic meaning in the primary instance. Rather, attention to the refrain
emphasizes that there are modalities of becoming that language does not and
cannot adequately represent or encompass. It is to consider the excess that
escapes language, a form of which is affect.
GIFs perform both more and less than what they ostensibly represent. A
GIF will never fully signify within the limiting logic of signifier and signified
because they operate through the refrain—that is, through the loop—and this
operative mode situates it in obtuse relation to conventional systems of meaning
making. This is, as some scholars have argued, the condition of the GIF’s
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liberatory possibility. As I have suggested, disproportionate, if not exclusive,
emphasis has been focused on the GIF’s emancipatory potential in much of the
extant literature. One purpose of my discussion has been to challenge the
uncomplicated embrace of this emancipatory logic.
What has been at stake in this project, on one level, has been the
development of a theoretical hermeneutic sufficiently able to attend to the
problematic of the racialized reaction GIF as a form digital blackface. More
pointedly, I was interested in expanding upon Lauren Michele Jackson’s
provocation in her article, “Digital Blackface in Reaction GIFs,” that anti-Black
racist caricatures, particularly those used to communicate hyperbolic emotion,
constantly turned to images of Black women and femmes.6 In my attempt to
develop that hermeneutic, I turned to the figures of the mammy, the minstrel, and
the machine. I sought out their histories to construct a provisional genealogy of
digital blackface in the terms of this project. This genealogy was one that would
historicize the figures of the mammy, the minstrel, and the machine by placing
them in the contextual specificity across space-times; at the same time, it would
exhume their figural continuities which have proven perniciously able to keep
them in a state of racially subordinating duress. I proposed the idea of makingmachine as a reflexive heuristic to further interrogate how the racialized reaction
GIF functioned as a contemporary manifestation of the converged, intertwined
histories of the mammy, minstrel, and machine. I then turned to the GIF itself,
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with an eye toward examining the object through the optics of medium specificity
and temporality. I contended that a consequence of the image’s endless
cyclicality was the production of an affective intensity that charged the process of
racializing subordination effected by the circulation of racialized reaction GIFs.
Making-machine, I argued, was the bimodal process through which a making of
Black subjectivity as incommensurate with the ontological category of
personhood was achieved. It contemporaneously engendered movement through
a politics of recognition that transformed the Black subject into a machinic, lessthan-human entity while extracting that Black subject’s affective labor through
GIF performance to provide a motor for that dialectic of recognition.
Said more broadly, however, what has been at stake in this project is
thinking the character of a methodology capable of resisting a certain act of
violence recursively foundational to American sociality. This is the act of violence
that radically dislocates Blackness from an ontology of personhood; one mode
through which this act is iteratively executed is the process of making-machine
subtended by racialized reaction GIFs. To conclude, then, I would like to turn
these provisional methodological gestures toward an object cited earlier, the GIF
of Real Housewives of Atlanta (RHOA) cast member and star Linnethia Monique
“NeNe” Leakes.7 This GIF, which bears the title “Nene Leakes Shade GIF,”
contains an image of Leakes tossing her hand into the air and remarking upon
her enjoyment of what was likely a scene of her costars throwing subtle but
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unapologetic jabs at one another. Shared almost 50 million times, a figure that in
all probability grossly underestimates the number of times the image has
circulated, this GIF of Leakes typifies what Jackson acknowledged in her
analysis: “Extreme joy, annoyance, anger and occasions for drama and gossip
are a magnet for images of [B]lack people, especially [B]lack femmes.”8 But, what
kind of affective labor is Leakes performing here? What are its consequences?
How does this preceding discussion, which dialectically moved previously
abstract inquiries into the register of the concrete, afford an understanding of
these questions?
If thought about in emergent contextual relation with the GIF, affective
labor becomes conceptually bound to the image’s stylized display and mode of
circulation. That is, the affective labor performed by a GIF—by the
aforementioned GIF of Leakes, for example—is performed according to a
process by which certain temporally bracketed scenes are selected for
transformation into looping sequences. The selection of these scenes, in this
case, a scene excised from an episode of RHOA, is not necessarily a function of
whatever quantum of affective intensity the scene is presumed to generate.
Rather, a complex, emergent, and multivalent process, influenced by factors
such as the moment’s recognized popularity as represented in forms other than
the GIF, the scene’s relevance to the themes and motifs of its original forum, and
the scene’s relative intelligibility if rendered into GIF format, might result in the
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selection of certain scenes to be transformed into GIFs. Nonetheless, attention
must be directed at what kind of affective labor the images already available for
circulation can perform, and with nearly 50 million individual instances of
exchange, the “NeNe Leakes Shade GIF” taps into a site of tendential logics
powerfully resonant with American sociality.
That Leakes is among the most known and successful members of the
broader Housewives brand is apparent, and her popularity is in no doubt related
to her particular method of representing celebrity. If the boisterousness of
Leakes’ disposition, one of the traits for which is she known, might possibly be
regarded as a performance of excess oriented toward stabilizing the tenuous
circumstances of reality-television celebrity, what does this mean for the
reproduction and dissemination of scenes of that conscious excess at a rate that
approaches 50 million instances thereof? My point here is first to identify certain
tendential logics of American sociality related to the racialized reaction GIF,
which, in this instance, might include: the uncertainty of capitalistic gain through
the ephemeral platform of reality-television celebrity; Leakes’ performance of
aggrandized emotional responses to staged dramaturgy of “reality” television; the
necessity of performing such aggrandized and hyperbolic responses if Leakes is
to continue to secure her position on the show’s cast; as well the adoption of
those responses via digital blackface GIFs by non-Black persons to “naturalize”
Blackness as such GIFs represent it. Second, it is to interrogate how these
tendential logics come to fold into one another and thereby stabilize the social
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economies to which they are integral, including those of subordinating
racialization.
Leakes’ professional labor, itself dependent on the intelligible performance
of hyperbolic affect, becomes doubly affective in her transformation into GIF
content; the complex negotiation with racialization and its attendant violences in
which Leakes is forced to engage becomes a durative conflict of submission to
racialization, contestation of its terms, and the digital spread and flattening of that
complex process. Through her virtual presence, one that spans multiple networks
and digital media forms, Leakes becomes a celebrity icon but also undergoes an
evacuating process of iconography. That is, she is made representative of a
certain “essence” of personhood, but in her coerced submission to the
iconographic modes of digital reproduction, the portion of that constituted
“essence” that may have been recognizable as commensurate with the
ontological category of personhood is placed under a profoundly hydraulic
pressure. With each loop of Leakes casually throwing her hand into the air, the
“NeNe Leakes Shade GIF” further impresses the iconographic process of
making-machine. Reading the racialized reaction GIF in this way, it should come
as no surprise that so many discussions of the image invoke the idea of the
automaton—while too few recognize the imbricated histories of the machine and
the Black body.
In her cultural history of the mammy figure, Kimberly Wallace-Sanders
states that the lexical marker “mammy” was understood as both the title and the
name of an otherwise anonymous Black woman. The work of “mammy” was both
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to singularize and universalize Black women, effacing and subsuming their
differences under its avariciously capacious sign. Moreover, if “mammy” was
every Black woman, she was also, as a necessary correlative, no Black woman;
“mammy” existed, rather paradoxically, only because she did not and count not
exist under the conceptual ontology “mammy” signified. Leakes is not the only
Black woman whose bodily form has been commodified for GIF circulation.
Indeed, she is one of many. However, if Wallace-Sanders’ statement is taken at
its most literal level, certain questions become available. Under the frenzied
reproduction of GIFs featuring Black women, a frenzy submitted to the logics of
mammification and minstrelization, can any of these women be recognized as
having a singular name, a singular subjectivity, a difference that is irreducible
without losing the propriety of its claim to access the ontological category of
personhood? How is Leakes recognized? Or, rather, does her recognizability
depend on her not being recognizable at all?
At the beginning of this discussion, I gestured toward the cellphone
footage recorded during some of the most recent episodes of racially motivated
police brutality in the United States. The footage I referenced had been taken by
community members, frequently by people of color, some of whom had intimate
relationships with those who were murdered. I noted that the steadiness of the
footage, when read against the intensely violent horrors it was documenting,
almost eluded belief. The steadiness was almost machinic, and it could not help
but incite the dread of the uncanny, the sense that what is being witnessed must
be but also cannot be a scene of interpersonal interaction. Such footage speaks
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to the process of making-machine effected by the circulation of racialized
reaction GIFs. Making-machine involves the contested submission of dynamic
becoming to inert being; it requires disavowing recognizable life for the adoption
of a simulacrum of near death. Black subjects’ self-production as machinic is a
necessary, but, as is abundantly apparent, insufficient means to survive the
brutality of the state as well as the racist violence that is foundational to the
character of American sociality. Making-machine might be properly understood
as approaching a paradoxical impasse of Black subjectivity, whereby submission
to this bodily inertia effects the very reading of Black bodies as inhuman and thus
unrecognizable within the ontological category of personhood.
Within a liberal political context, ideas of broad representation are usually
hailed as profound markers of social progress and inclusion. To be represented
(without querying how the subject is represented) is the benchmark of liberal
political efficacy. My efforts here have been to complicate such a narrative, to
query how a seemingly innocuous digital object like the GIF can perform all the
violence suggested of it and far more. This text has also been an exercise in the
development of a reflexive digital ethics. To think about which GIF to send in an
instance of digital communication may not be enough. To query the algorithms of
their availability, the structures conditioning their possibility, the sense of intuitive
justification that precedes their use—these are the ethical objectives this project
has hoped to kindle. As NeNe Leakes remarks in the GIF propelling this
discussion, I have hoped that this text walks alongside other solidaristic efforts to
inaugurate a political and social context in which Black women indeed can live.
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